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INTRODUCTION

For a quarter century or more, American courts have been
interpreting and construing the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.).' Although in large measure the Code has been a considerable success, various problems have arisen, many of the most
challenging and frustrating of which have developed in the application and construction of certain sections of Article 2. Courts
have been notoriously unsuccessful, for example, in their elaborations of U.C.C. § 2-207, the "battle of the forms" section. 2 Sect University Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh
School of Law
1. The first jurisdiction to enact the Uniform Commerical Code was Pennsylvania in 1953, effective in 1954. By the 1960's, all American jurisdictions except Louisiana had enacted the Code. Louisiana has since enacted parts of the
Code, but not Article 2. Notwithstanding protestations concerning Article 9,
Aritcle 2, drafted principally by Karl Llewellyn, may be the most innovative Article of the Code.
2. For a recent effort to analyze the problems of U.C.C. § 2-207, see Mur-
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tion 2-209, captioned, "Modification, Rescission and Waiver,"
has proven equally mysterious. 3 Recent judicial attempts to provide certainty and predictability with regard to future applications
of U.C.C. § 2-209 have been counterproductive. 4 The conventional scholarly wisdom concerning § 2-209 has left many questions unanswered, 5 and other scholarship has suggested
implausible theoretical constructs. 6 In order to unravel the § 2209 mystery and to provide a workable analysis of the section, it is
important to reconsider the purposes of § 2-209 within the underlying purposes of Article 2 of the Code.
ray, The Chaos of the "Battle of the Forms": Solutions, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1307 (1986);
see also, Murray, A Proposed Revision of Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commerical Code,
6J. LAw & Com. 337 (1986).
3. Section 2-209 provides:
(1) An agreement modifying a contract within this Article needs
no consideration to be binding.
(2) A signed agreement which excludes modification or rescission
except by a signed writing cannot be otherwise modified or rescinded,
but except as between merchants such a requirement on a form supplied by the merchant must be separately signed by the other party.
(3) The requirements of the statute of frauds section of this Article
(Section 2-201) must be satisfied if the contract as modified is within its
provisions.
(4) Although an attempt at modification or rescission does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (2) or (3) it can operate as a waiver.
(5) A party who has made a waiver affecting an executory portion
of the contract may retract the waiver by reasonable notification received by the other party that strict performance will be required of any
term waived, unless the retraction would be unjust in view of a material
change of position in reliance on the waiver.
U.C.C. § 2-209 (1978).
4. See, e.g., the majority and dissenting opinions in Wisconsin Knife Works
v. National Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280 (7th Cir. 1986)(determining that contract orally modified by seller regarding delivery dates could not be enforced
absent showing of reliance by buyer). For a discussion of Wisconsin Knife Works,
see infra note 168-242 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g.,J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 42-49, 53 (2d ed. 1980)(discussing U.C.C. § 2-209 effects regarding contract modification, waiver and estoppel); Hillman, A Study of
Uniform Commerical Code Methodology: Contract Modification Under Article Two, 59
N.C.L. REV. 335 (1981) (discussing modification of a contract and its
enforceability).
6. See, e.g., Eisler, OralModification of Sales Contracts Under the Uniform Commerical Code: The Statute of Frauds Problem, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 277 (1980)("[attempt] to
dispel some of the confusion concerning oral modification of written sales contracts when the contract as modified comes within the Statute of Frauds"); Comment, Waiver of the Statute of Frauds Under Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-209:
Double-E Sportswear Corp. v. Girard Trust Bank, 15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 699
(1974)(discussing "seemingly inescapable" problems created by U.C.C. § 2209(4) if interpreted to permit waiver of statute of frauds requirements of
U.C.C. § 2-201).
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II.

A

FIRST GLANCE AT SECTION

2-209

How would the classical contracts lawyer view U.C.C. § 2209? The first subsection makes contract modifications enforceable without consideration. 7 By the time the drafters of the Code
were ready to present a draft for enactment, the pre-existing duty
rule of classical contract law was regarded by many as indefensible. 8 Permitting the parties to a contract for the sale of goods to
make modifications enforceable without the technical constraint
of consideration 9 is a clear illustration of the underlying philosophy of Article 2, which seeks to identify the factual bargain of the
parties' ° notwithstanding technical requirements that interfere
Thus, this
with judicial recognition of that factual bargain.'
change in contract law was hardly radical in the eyes of classical
contracts lawyers, although some undoubtedly would have preferred more precision in the statutory language of subsection (1)
7. "An agreement modifying a contract within this Article needs no consideration to be binding." U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (1978).
8. One of the classic denunciations of the pre-existing duty rule is found in
an opinion by Minnesota Justice Stone: "The [pre-existing duty] doctrine ... is
one of the relics of antique law which should have been discarded long ago. It is
evidence of the former capacity of lawyers and judges to make the requirement
of consideration an overworked shibboleth rather than a logical and just standard of actionability." Rye v. Philips, 203 Minn. 567, 569, 282 N.W. 459, 460
(1938).
9. Comment 1 to U.C.C. § 2-209 illustrates the anti-technical nature of Article 2 with respect to modifications: "This section seeks to protect and make
effective all necessary and desirable modifications of sales contracts without regard to the technicalities which at present hamper such adjustments." U.C.C.
§ 2-209 comment 1 (1978).
10. For an analysis of the underlying philosophy of Article 2, see Murray,
The Article 2 Prism: The Underlying Philosophy of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (1981). I suggest in this article and elsewhere that
Article 2 is essentially concerned with identification of the factual bargain of the
parties, their "agreement" as defined in U.C.C. § 1-201(3), to arrive at their
"true understanding." See U.C.C. § 2-202 comment 2 (1978).
11. Illustrations of the anti-technical nature of Article 2 include U.C.C. § 2204(3) (1978)(contract does not fail for indefiniteness notwithstanding absence
of one or more terms, if parties intended to make contract and there is basis for
appropriate remedy); U.C.C. § 2-206 comment I (1978)("[fOormer technical
rules as to acceptance . . . are rejected"); U.C.C. § 2-209(1) comment 1
(1978)("[t]his section seeks to protect and make effective all necessary and desirable modifications of sales contracts without regard to the technicalities which at
present hamper such adjustments."). In keeping with Article 2 of the U.C.C.,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit sought to reflect the
reality of the marketplace and avoid "the overly legalistic interpretations which
the Code seeks to abolish." Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d
3, 10 (4th Cir. 1971). The court also mentioned the urging of Karl Llewellyn
that "overly simplistic and overly legalistic interpretation of a contract should be
shunned." Id. at 11.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1987

3

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 1
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32: p. I

and its comments.1 2 The essential change in the pre-existing duty
rule found relatively little resistance at the time it was proposed
and inspires virtually no resistance today. It was an unremarkable
3
but welcome change in monistic contract law.'
Subsection (2) of § 2-20914 was much more controversial. If
the parties included a clause in their original written contract precluding oral modifications (a "no oral modification" or NOM
clause), 15 the suggestion that any attempted oral modification
would be inoperative because it would violate the parties' own
writing requirement-their "private" statute of frauds-sounds
almost trite. However, the common law of contracts was predicated upon a commitment to the principle that the parties to a
6
contract should not be deterred from changing their minds.'
12. In his analysis of § 2-209 for the New York Law Revision Commission,
Professor Patterson had difficulty with the phrase, "contract within this Article"
in § 2-209(1) since it had no established meaning in the Code. He was also quite
dubious about the "good faith" standard in § 1-201(19) ("honesty in fact") or
the merchant good faith standard in § 2-103(1)(b) (commercial reasonableness
and honesty in fact) as "adequate" to dispose of the problem of extorted modifications. Though he found the good faith standard only in a comment (comment
2), Professor Patterson did not specifically suggest its inclusion in the statutory
language. He noted that "agreement" was defined in § 1-201(3) as "bargain in
fact" and, to him, that "means consideration" (citing RESTATEMENT Or CONTRACTS § 76 (1932)). Therefore, the language in § 2-209(l)-"agreement . . .
needs no consideration"-"is apparently tautological." He had no difficulty,
however, in concluding that § 2-209(1) rejects the pre-existing duty rule. Analysis of Professor Edwin W. Patterson, Columbia Law School, 1 N.Y. Law Rev.
Commission, Study of the Uniform Commercial Code, 307-08 (1955).
13.
[T]he shortcomings of contract analysis in modern legal literature indicates that even today our understanding leaves much to be desired.
The most serious of these shortcomings is the attempt to explain the
whole law of contracts in terms of a few fundamental principles uniformly applicable throughout the whole field ....
Such a monistic approach serves only to distort the real role which contract has played in
the evolution of our society. It results in more or less lifeless abstractions and achieves at best a 'formal,' but not a 'substantive' rationality.
F. KESSLER & M. SHARP, CONTRACTS CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (1953).
14. "A signed agreement which excludes modifications or rescission except
by a signed writing cannot be otherwise modified or rescinded, but except as
between merchants such a requirement on a form supplied by the merchant
must be separately signed by the other party." U.C.C. § 2-209(2) (1978).
15. A typical NOM clause might read as follows: "The parties to this agreement hereby agree and understand that this agreement may not be modified or
rescinded except by an agreement evidenced by a writing, signed by these parties or by their duly authorized agents. Any modification that fails to meet this
signed writing requirement shall be null and void."
16. See, e.g., 6 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, § 1295, at 206 & n.32
(1962). Professor Corbin states in his treatise that "[a]ny written contract . ..
can be rescinded or varied at will by the oral agreement of the parties; and this is
held to be true, except as otherwise provided by statute, even of a written agreement that the contract shall not be orally varied or rescinded." Id. Judge Car-
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Therefore, under the common law, NOM clauses were essentially
inoperative. There were, however, statutory antecedents to § 2209(2), the most significant of which was a New York enactment. 17 The New York statute avoided certain analytical deficiencies inherent in other NOM statutes by expressly including oral
"discharges" along with modifications.' 8 Since earlier drafts of
§ 2-209(2) had not included rescissions, 19 the influence of the
New York statute on § 2-209(2) cannot be gainsaid.2 0 A number
of contracts scholars, led by Professor Corbin, were as displeased
with § 2-209(2) as they had been with the New York and other
statutory enactments requiring the enforceability of NOM
clauses. 2 ' Thus, while § 2-209(2) cannot be said to have been innovative, it was controversial.
dozo stated early this century in a New York case that: "Those who make a
contract may unmake it. The clause which forbids a change, may be changed
like any other." Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N.Y. 380, 387, 122
N.E. 378, 381 (1919). More recently Justice Musmanno of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that even
[t]he most ironclad written contract can always be cut into by the acetylene torch of parol modification supported by adequate proof ...
Even where the contract specifically states that no non-written modification will be recognized, the parties may yet alter their agreement by
parol negotiation. The hand that pens a writing may not gag the
mouths of the assenting parties. The pen may be more precise in permanently recording what is to be done, but it may not still the tongues
which bespeak an improvement in or modification of what has been
written.
Wagner v. Graziano Constr. Co., 390 Pa. 445, 448, 136 A.2d 82, 83-84 (1957).
LIG.

17. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 33(c) (McKinney 1964), repealed by
§ 19-101 (1964).

GENERAL OB-

18. If a statute merely provides that oral modifications are prohibited where
the original contract was evidenced by a writing containing an NOM clause, the
statute will not preclude an oral rescission, discharge or termination of the original contract. See, e.g., Cowin v. Salmon, 244 Ala. 285, 13 So. 2d 190 (1943)(written executory contract held capable of verbal modification or rescission unless
statute requires such agreement to be in writing or agreement postpones its effect until writing is signed).
19. Drafts of § 2-209(2) and 2-209(4) prior to 1957 did not include rescissions. The recommendations of the Permanent Editorial Board in 1956 recommended the inclusion of rescissions in these two subsections. XVIII E. KELLY,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAF-S

29-30 (1984).

20. Professor Patterson viewed § 2-209(2) as essentially a codification of
the New York Personal Property Law § 33(c), first enacted in 1941. He stated
that § 2-209(2) was "based on an earlier version" of this law that did not preclude oral discharges. That statute was amended twice and the last amendment
in 1952 prohibited "terminations." See Statement of Professor Patterson before
the N.Y. Law Revision Commission, supra note 12.
21. See 6 A. CORBIN, supra note 16, § 1295, at 210-12. For Professor
Corbin's view of these statutes, see infra note 121. For a further discussion of
satisfaction of NOM requirements, see infra notes 116-38 and accompanying
text.
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Subsection (3) of § 2-20922 is drafted in language that was
used by many courts and scholars prior to the Code to identify a
not uncommon situation. If the "contract as modified" is within
the statute of frauds, the requirements of the statute of frauds
would have to be met to permit enforcement of the modified contract. Conversely, an oral contract unenforceable because it
could not be performed within one year from its making, for example, become enforceable "as modified" when an oral modification made the contract performable within a year. 23 The concept
was relatively straightforward. It was popularly distinguished
from subsection (2) (the "private" statute of frauds) by those who
called it the "public" statute of frauds modification provision.
There is nothing in the drafting history of § 2-209(3) to suggest
any departure from pre-Code concepts. In fact to some, subsection (3) appeared superfluous. 24 The well-known "contract as
modified" phrase was apparently deliberately taken by the draft25
ers of § 2-209(3) from the earliest drafts of that subsection.
Yet, there has been considerable difficulty in the subsection's
interpretation and application by courts and scholars as subsequent discussion will reveal. Again, however, to the classical contracts lawyer, § 2-209(3) would not have appeared a dramatic
26
departure.
The fourth subsection of § 2-20927 appeared novel because
of its apparent effect on § 2-209(2).28 To those who were less
than pleased with the codification in § 2-209(2) of criticized enactments enforcing NOM clauses, subection (4) opened a "big
back door" offering welcome relief.29 The relief was not total,
however, otherwise, subsection (4) would simply contradict subsections (2) and (3) which made oral modifications inoperative. If
22. "The requirements of the statute of frauds section of this Article (Section 2-201) must be satisfied if the contract as modified is within its provisions."
U.C.C. § 2-209(3) (1978).
23. See, e.g., Flowood Corp. v. Chain, 247 Miss. 434, 152 So. 2d 915 (1963).
See generally 2 A. CORBIN, supra note 16, § 304.
24. See Professor Patterson's view of § 2-209(3), see supra note 12, at 64344.
25. For example, that phraseology is found in the 1949 draft. See VI E.
KELLY, supra note 19, at 77.
26. See Professor Patterson's view, supra note 12, at 643-44.
27. "Although an attempt at modification or rescission does not satisfy the

requirements of subsection (2) or (3) it can operate as a waiver." U.C.C. § 2209(4) (1978).
28. Professor Corbin, however, felt that § 2-209(4) was "consistent with the

general law of contracts." 2 A.

CORBIN,

supra note 16, § 301, at 89 n.2.

29. See Professor Patterson's statement, supra note 12, at 644.
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an attempt at modification not satisfying subsection (2) or (3)
could operate as a waiver, one possible reading of (4) suggested a
fatuous construction, i.e., subsections (2) and (3) require modifications and rescissions to be evidenced by writings and subsection (4) removes the writing requirement. Subsection (4) also
raised additional interpretation issues at every turn. What is "an
attempt at modification or rescission [that] does not satisfy the
requirements of subsection (2) or (3)"? Whatever "it" is, "it can
operate as waiver," that is, it is not really a waiver, but can be
given the operative effect of a waiver. Then, of course, we find
ourselves in the morass of one of the more amorphous terms in
our legal vocabulary-"waiver." If an attempt at modification not
satisfying subsection (2) or (3) can operate as a waiver, are we to
30
assume that at times it "can" and at other times it "cannot"?
Subsection (4) left much room for improvement and was destined
to present numerous difficulties to courts and those scholars who
were courageous enough to take it on.
Subsection (5)31 appeared to be a companion to subsection
(4). Its terms, however, exacerbated the confusion. Assuming we
know what "it" is that "operate[s] as a waiver," if the waiver affects an executory portion of the contract, it may be retracted
through reasonable notice that strict performance "of any term
waived" will be required absent "material" reliance prior to the
notification. At this point, the classical contracts lawyer may have
been particularly disturbed. We are not even certain of what "it"
is that can be "waived," although we know that whatever "it" is,
"it" occurs through "an attempt at modification or rescission"
that "can operate as a waiver" under subsection (4). Our analytical juices suggest attempts at understanding "an attempt at modification [that] does not satisfy subsection (2) or (3)" because of
the mysterious "it" that we must identify under subsection (4) if
we are to have any hope of understanding subsection (5).
If a modification or rescission were evidence by a writing, it
would satisfy the requirements of subsection (2) or (3). May we,
therefore, conclude that a modification or rescission that does not
30. For a discussion of modifications as "waivers," see infra notes 134-59
and accompanying text.
31.
A party who has made a waiver affecting an executory portion of the
contract may retract the waiver by reasonable notification received by
the other party that strict performance will be required of any term
waived, unless the retraction would be unjust in view of a material
change of position in reliance on the waiver.
U.C.C. § 2-209(5) (1978).
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satisfy subsection (2) or (3) is necessarily an oral modification and
that this oral modification can operate as a waiver? At least one
reasonable interpretation of the language of § 2-209(3) precludes
that analysis. Section 2-209(3) merely requires that § 2-201 (the
statute of frauds section of the Code) be "satisfied if the contract
as modified is within its provisions." 32 While a writing will make a
modified contract within § 2-201 enforceable, § 2-201 expressly
permits devices in lieu of a writing: reliance in a specially manufactured goods situation,"3 admission of the contract in a party's
"pleading, testimony or otherwise in court,"3 4 and performance
by either party, i.e., payment and acceptance or receipt and acceptance of the goods. 3 5 Moreover, if the "party against whom
enforcement is sought" is a merchant, a contract will be enforceable against that party even though he has signed no writing but
has merely failed to object to a satisfactory memorandum sent by
the other merchant-party within ten days from its receipt.3 6 Finally, notwithstanding the opening phrase of § 2-201 ("Except as
otherwise provided in this section"), many courts have found a
general reliance exception to the § 2-201 writing requirement.3 7
Thus, there are five ways in which the § 2-201 requirement
may be satisfied beyond a writing signed by the party against
whom enforcement is sought. To suggest, therefore, that the § 2209(4) language, "an attempt at modification [that] does not satisfy the requirements of subsection ... (3)," is only an oral modi32. For the full text of § 2-209(3), see supra note 22.
33. U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(a) (1978). This section specifically states:
if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the buyer and are not
suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of the seller's business
and the seller, before notice of repudiation is received and under circumstances which reasonably indicate that the goods are for the buyer,
has made either a substantial beginning of their manufacture or commitments for their procurement.

Id.
34. Id. § 2-201(3)(b).
35. Id. § 2-201(3)(c).
36. Id. § 2-201(2).
37. Cases finding a general reliance satisfaction of U.C.C. § 2-201 include:
R.S. Bennett & Co. v. Economy Mechanical Indus., 606 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1979);
RobertJohnson Grain Co. v. Chemical Interchange Co., 541 F.2d 207 (8th Cir.
1976); Warder & Lee Elevator v. Britten, 274 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1979); Potter v.
Hatter Farms, 56 Or. App. 254, 641 P.2d 628 (1982).
Cases rejecting the application of detrimental reliance to satisfy the requirements of § 2-201 include: McDabco v. Chet Adams Co., 548 F. Supp. 456 (D.
S.C. 1982); Ivey's Plumbing & Elec. Co. v. Petrochem Maintenance, 463 F. Supp.
543 (N.D. Miss. 1978); Cox v. Cox, 292 Ala. 106, 289 So. 2d 609 (1974).
For a discussion of the reliance requirements, see infra notes 146-63 and
accompanying text.
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fication again seems questionable at first glance. If, however, the
drafting intention was to consider "attempts at modification" in
§ 2-209(4) only at the moment such modification agreements
were made, the exceptions to the basic writing requirement of
§ 2-20138 may not interfere with our notion that "attempts at
modification" in subsection (4) are oral modifications, since the
§ 2-201 exceptions are post-formation exceptions. While this interpretation would permit all attempts at modification not satisfying subsection (3) to be oral modifications, it seems to fail
because a post-formation satisfaction of § 2-201 is simply an adequate substitute for a writing fulfilling the evidentiary function of
§ 2-201. The "public" statute of frauds is not "waived" by such a
substitute. It is "satisfied" through any of the statutory excep39
tions to the basic writing requirement.
Further disconcertion is supplied by the language of § 2209(2) which rather blatantly states: "A signed writing which excludes modification or rescission except by a signed writing cannot be otherwise modified or rescinded." 40 Does this language
suggest that a "signed writing" is the exclusive manner of satisfying § 2-209(2), apart from the "waiver" in § 2-209(4)? If
merchants executed a signed agreement with an NOM clause,
would a confirmation of an oral modification be effective against
the other merchant if he did not object within ten days of receipt?
Would an admission of a modification in one's pleadings, testi38. See U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (1978). The basic writing requirement found in
this subsection requires a writing to be signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought. Id.
39. For a discussion of these exceptions, see supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text. The four statutory exceptions in § 2-201 may be properly referred
to as "exceptions" because of the opening phrase of that section: "Except as
otherwise provided in this section." The exceptions may be viewed as post-formation devices to satisfy the statute. For example, course of performance satisfies the statute in relation to specially manufactured goods; admissions and
merchant's conformation also occur after formation, yet may satisfy the statute.
The basic satisfaction device, i.e., a writing signed by the party to be charged
under § 2-201 (1), may either occur simultaneously with formation or be accomplished post-formation.
The judicially engrafted general reliance "exception" recognized by some
courts may be viewed as a method of "defeating" the statute of frauds. See, e.g.,
Warder & Lee Elevator, Inc. v. Britten, 274 N.W. 2d 339 (Iowa 1979)(holding
oral contract "within" statute of frauds taken "out" of statute due to reliance by
promisee). However, general reliance may also be viewed as a satisfaction device, albeit judicially recognized as not having been displaced under U.C.C. § 1103, which preserves undisplaced rules and principles, since the specially manufactured goods exception is, essentially, a narrow reliance method of
satisfaction.
40. U.C.C. § 2-209(2) (1978). For the full text of this subsection, see supra
note 14.
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mony or otherwise in court permit enforcement of the modification notwithstanding the NOM clause? Would one of the other
statutory or judicial exceptions to § 2-201 be effective to make a
modification enforceable notwithstanding an NOM clause?
Again, should one of those substitutes occur, would it then be
appropriate to characterize the NOM clause as having been
"waived"?
Finally, § 2-209(5) rears its puzzling head in permitting retraction of a waiver if notification of such retraction is received by
the other party that "strict performance will be required of any
term waived" 4 1 absent reliance by the other party. We had wondered what "it" meant in § 2-209(4): "Although an attempt at
modification or rescission does not satisfy the requirements of
subsection (2) or (3) it can operate as a waiver. " 4 2 If an attempt at
modification not satisfying subsection (2) or (3) is, arguably, only
an oral modification, then "it" (the oral modification) operates as
a waiver. But of what is it a waiver? Is it a waiver of the "public"
statute of frauds with respect to § 2-209(3) modifications? If so,
what is the "term" referred to in § 2-209(5) that a party may insist
be strictly performed, absent reliance, despite a prior oral modification? Section § 2-209(5) speaks of waiving a "term," but the
"public" statute of frauds is not a contract term. An NOM clause,
however, is a term of the original contract. Does § 2-209(5) speak
only to rejuvenating NOM clauses and not to recalling the "public" statute of frauds? If so, what happens to a waiver of the § 2209(3) ("public" statute of frauds) requirement contemplated by
§ 2-209(4)? Can that requirement be reinstated by a retraction of
its waiver?
Collectively, all of these individual puzzles have shrouded
§ 2-209 in a mysterious cloak and neither courts nor legal scholars have, to this point, succeeded in unraveling the mystery.
There is a felt need for a workable analysis of § 2-209, and this
article is designed to provide that analysis.
III.

CONSIDERATION AND THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS:

THE

HOLISTIC ANALYSIS

We have seen that the first subsection of § 2-209 allows for
the enforcement of good faith modifications without considera41. U.C.C. § 2-209(5) (1978) (emphasis added). For the full text of this
subsection, see supra note 31.
42. U.C.C. § 2-209(4) (1978).
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tion. 43 The remainder of the section deals with the requirement
of a writing for a modification or rescission of a contract evidenced by a writing containing a "no oral modification" (NOM)
clause;44 the requirement that the Article 2 statute of frauds be
satisfied if the contract as modified is within that section; 45 an enigmatic subsection giving "waiver" effect to oral modifications
that violate earlier subsections 46 and a final subsection that seems
to allow retraction of an oral modification absent reliance. 47 Why
should a section containing four subsections dealing with the
"public" or "private" statute of frauds begin with a subsection
that abrogates the pre-existing duty rule if the modification is in
43. Though the "good faith" requirement is not found in the language of
the subsection, comment 2 to § 2-209 states that "modifications made thereunder must meet the test of good faith imposed by this Act." U.C.C. § 2-209 comment 2 (1978). The "good faith" obligation is found in U.C.C. § 1-203 but that
section imposes an obligation of good faith in the performance or enforcement of
"[e]very contract or duty within" the Code. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1978). It has been
suggested that contract modifications are "more readily" thought of as coming
within the formation stage of the contract rather than the performance or enforcement stages. If "good faith" is a substantive requirement, the comment cannot
insert such a requirement since the comment can only serve as a restatement of
what is contained in the section. Eisler, supra note 6, at 279 n.6. A further reading of comment 2 to § 2-209, however, suggests that the comment is focusing
upon the performance stage of the original contract: "The effective use of bad
faith to escape performance on the original contract terms is barred, and the
extortion of a 'modification' without legitimate commercial reason is ineffective
as a violation of the duty of good faith." U.C.C. § 2-209 comment 2 (1978).
From the perspective of excusing performance of the unmodified contract, a bad
faith modification will fail and the duty of performance under the original contract remains since there is an absence of good faith. In his analysis of § 2-209
for the New York Law Revision Commission, Professor Patterson suggests:
Strictly speaking, no one, not even the parties to a contract, can "modify" the terms of a contract already made, any more than one can "modify" the day on which George Washington was actually born. Any socalled "modification" of a contract involves analytically two steps:
(a) The termination by agreement of all obligations under the (first)
contract; (b) the making of a (second) contract containing some of the
terms of the first contract and some different terms.
1 N. Y. Law Revision Commission Study of the Uniform Commercial Code 309
(643) (1955).
44. U.C.C. § 2-209(2) (1978). This subsection is often called the "private"
statute of frauds requirement. For the full text of U.C.C. § 2-209(2), see supra
note 14. For a discussion of the "private" statute of frauds see, supra notes 1517 and accompanying text.
45. U.C.C. § 2-201 is incorporated in U.C.C. § 2-209(3) often called the
"public" statute of frauds. For a discussion of the relation of U.C.C. § 2-201 to
U.C.C. § 2-209(3), see supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
46. U.C.C. § 2-209(4) has been the most difficult subsection for courts and
commentators. For a discussion of U.C.C. § 2-209(4), see supra notes 27-29 and
accompanying text. For the text of U.C.C. § 2-209(4),see supra note 27.
47. U.C.C. § 2-209(5) has caused considerable consternation in conjunction with subsection (4). For the text of U.C.C. § 2-209(5), see supra note 31.
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good faith? Why is it there? A conceptual framework presenting
a holistic view of § 2-209 was probably inevitable. To some, there
had to be a reason behind changing the pre-existing duty rule in a
section of Article 2 that was dominantly concerned with the statute of frauds. This premise has produced a view of § 2-209 that
suggests a return to a classic analysis of legal formalities such as
48
the seal or other formalistic devices.
Professor Lon Fuller long ago provided a splendid analysis of
the three functions performed by formalistic devices: 1) the evidentiary function (evidence of the existence and terms of a contract); 2) the cautionary function (a check against inconsiderate
action) and 3) a channeling function (the Fuller innovation: signaling the enforceability of the promise).49 If the drafters of § 2209 decided to make good faith modifications enforceable under
§ 2-209(1), they were surrendering the three formal functions
that consideration may be said to supply. By inserting a writing
requirement in § 2-209(3), however, the holistic view suggests
that the drafters intended to restore the evidentiary, cautionary
and channeling functions through this requirement. 50 Under this
view, an unsupported modification, i.e., one not supported by
consideration, must be evidenced by a writing to be enforceable
because § 2-209(3) serves two functions. First, the requirement of
the § 2-201 statute of frauds must be met. Second, even if it is
met, subsection (3) provides "a formal basis for enforcement of
the modification agreement." 5 ' To illustrate this point, one commentator, Professor Eisler, provides an example of an unsupported oral modification that is admitted by the party against
whom enforcement of the oral modification is sought in that
party's pleadings, testimony or otherwise in court. Section 2201(3) (b) permits satisfaction of the statute of frauds through
such admissions. 52 Since one reading of § 2-209(3) merely re48. This is the view suggested by Professor Eisler. See generally Eisler, supra
note 6.
49. Fuller, Considerationand Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800-01 (1941). It
is interesting to note that Professor Fuller relied upon a Llewellyn suggestion:
" 'Inall legal systems the effort is to find definite marks which shall at once include the promises which ought to be enforceable, exclude those which ought
not to be, and signalize those which will be.' " Id. at 801 n.5 (quoting Llewellyn,
What Price Contract?, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 738 (1931)).
50. See Eisler, supra note 6, at 297.
51. Id. For the full text of § 2-209(3), see supra note 22.

52. See U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(b) (1978). This section specifically provides:
A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (1)
[the writing requirement] but which is valid in other respects is
enforceable
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quires satisfaction of the § 2-201 statute of frauds "if the contract
as modified is within its provisions," an admisison of an oral modification in accordance with the requirements of § 2-201(3)(b) appears to satisfy § 2-209(3) because it clearly satisfies § 2-201.
However, this is said to be incorrect because § 2-209(3) is more
than a mere statute of frauds requirement:
Because the modification was not supported by consideration, a formal basis for enforcement of the modification
agreement was necessary. The admission clearly performed the evidentiary function of a legal formality, but
failed to fulfill the cautionary function, because at the
time of the agreement there was nothing to apprise
53
[b]uyer that his promise would be legally enforceable.
Presumably, the writing in this illustration would also fulfill
the channeling function though it is not expressly mentioned. At
another point, however, Professor Eisler is content to dispense
with the cautionary and channeling functions if there is reliance
on an otherwise unsupported oral modification. Though "reliance performs neither a channeling nor a cautionary function," it
will suffice to make an oral modification enforceable because "justice" requires such enforcement. 54 Beyond this exception to the
analysis, Professor Eisler finds another. While an unsupported
oral modification will be unenforceable even if it is admitted, if a
merchant party seeking to enforce such a modification has sent a
confirmation of the modification and the other merchant party
does not object within ten days of its receipt, the unsupported
oral modification will be enforceable. 55 The rationale is interesting: the confirmation is notification to the other party that the
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his
pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a contract for sale was
made, but the contract is not enforceable under this provision beyond
the quantity of goods admitted....
Id.
53. Eisler, supra note 6, at 303.
54. Id. at 298. Here, the author is referring to the typical concept of detrimental reliance found in § 2-209(5).
55. See U.C.C. § 2-201(2) (1978). This subsection specifically states:
Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the
party receiving it has reason to know its contents, it satisfies the requirements of subsection (1) [writing requirement] against such party
unless written notice of objection to its contents is given within 10 days
after it is received.
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sender intends to rely on the oral modification and this should be
enough to warn the promisor that the agreement is legally enforceable. 56 Professor Eisler suggests a case in support of this
view 5 7 and the case, indeed, holds that a modification is enforceable through a § 2-201(2) confirmation. The opinion, however,
also suggests that any exception to the § 2-201 writing requirement would be effective to make an unsupported oral modification enforceable. 58 Moreover, that opinion relies upon a case
holding that an unsupported oral modification is clearly enforceable without a writing because the defendant failed to plead the
statute of frauds. 59 Neither court perceived any function of § 2209(3) beyond the satisfaction of the § 2-201 statute of frauds in
the modified contract. Professor Eisler suggests that enforcement
of an unsupported oral modification under the confirmation exception is based upon "an intent to rely" by the sender. 60 Here,
she seems to be suggesting a sort of "anticipatory reliance."
Since full-blown reliance does not serve the cautionary and channeling functions, it cannot be denied that anticipatory reliance
fails to serve those functions. Moreover, unlike reliance which
Professor Eisler believes serves the evidentiary function, anticipatory reliance does not necessarily serve even that single function.
This analysis of § 2-209 becomes more curious at almost
every turn. Another illustration confirms the curiosity. Buyer
and seller sign a writing evidencing a contract for the purchase
and sale of 100 items on credit at $10 per item. Seller agrees to
deliver on June 1. On May 1, the parties orally agree to a modification by which seller agrees to deliver the goods on May 15 and
buyer promises to pay cash on delivery. Because this is a "supported" modification, it requires no writing. The parties have
changed the time of delivery and payment terms but the original
writing satisfies the § 2-209(3) incorporation of § 2-201 with respect to the contract as modified because neither delivery nor
payment terms are required to be evidenced by a writing under
§ 2-201. If, however, the time of delivery were changed and that
56. Eisler, supra note 6, at 303.
57. See A & G Constr. Co. v. Reid Bros. Logging Co., 547 P.2d 1207 (Alaska
1976)(contractor obliged to pay increased rate for materials received and accepted subsequent to date of unsigned written modification of agreement).
58. Id. at 1215-16.
59. See Skinner v. Tober Foreign Motors, Inc., 353 Mass. 429, 187 N.E.2d
669 (1963); see also Bone Int'l, Inc. v.Johnson, 74 N.C. App. 703, 329 S.E.2d 714
(1985). For a discussion of Bone, see infra note 110.
60. Eisler, supra note 6, at 303 n.107.
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modification, albeit in good faith, were not supported by consideration, the modification would have to be evidenced by a writing-not because of § 2-201, but because § 2-209(3), itself,
requires a writing for an unsupported modification. This view is
confirmed by hypothetically changing the quantity term in a supported modification. If the original contract evidenced an exchange of 1000 widgets for $1000 and the parties orally agreed to
modify the terms to 1200 widgets for $1200, either a writing or
one of the other methods of satisfying § 2-201 would be necessary, notwithstanding the presence of consideration in the modification. Professor Eisler explains this result: "[T]he writing
requirement stems from § 2-201(1) (the statute of frauds), not
from § 2-209(3)."61 Thus, § 2-209(3) has a life or purpose of its
own apart from its incorporation of the § 2-201 requirement, i.e.,
the purpose of supplying a legal formality that would be missing if
there were no consideration supporting the modification.
There is not a scintilla of support in the drafting history of
§ 2-209 for the notion that § 2-209(3) was designed to require a
formalistic validation device 62 for unsupported modifications and
to incorporate the requirements of § 2-201 for all modifications.
To the extent Professor Eisler reviews any of the drafting history,
that history is either rejected or ignored. The analysis of Professor Patterson in the 1955 New York Law Revision Commission
Report is expressly cast aside. 6 3 Instead, Professor Eisler finds
61. Id. at 309 n. 132.
62. Professor Eisler adopts the "validation device" terminology from 3.
MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 124 (2d ed. 1974). See Eisler, supra note 6,
at 281 n.10.
63. See Eisler, supra note 6, at 295-96. Professor Eisler believes that
common-law analysis leads to anomalous results. Under the common
law, modifications of essential terms must be written accurately. Thus,
if subsection (3) follows the common law, as Professor Patterson stated,
then modifications under section 2-209(3) would have to be written because almost all terms are essential. Common-law analysis of the Statute of Frauds of section 2-201, however, would grant legal effect to oral
modifications because the only term that must be written under section
2-201 is the quantity term. Thus, comment 3, which requires modification agreements to be written, yields the same result as at common law,
but a literal interpretation of subsection (3) uses a common-law analysis
to grant enforcement of oral modifications.
Id. at 296.
This analysis is predicated on the assumption that Professor Patterson and
others who would subscribe to Professor Patterson's view that § 2-209(3) is consistent with common-law analyses of oral modifications and the statute of frauds,
failed to understand, or at least remember, the differences between § 2-201 and
its pre-Code ancestor, section 4 of the Uniform Sales Act, which itself was based
on section 17 of the 1677 Statute of Frauds. There is no basis for this assumption. Professor Eisler unwittingly views § 2-209(3) as if it had the effect of a
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support in a classic article dealing with the concept of legislative
intent 64 which has nothing to do with the Code, much less Article
2. She attempts to find solace in comment 3 to § 2-209 which
provides:
Subsections (2) and (3) are intended to protect against
false allegations of oral modifications. "Modification or
rescission" includes abandonment or other change by
mutual consent, contrary to the decision in Green v.
Doniger, 300 N.Y. 238, 90 N.E.2d 56 (1949); it does not
include unilateral "termination" or "cancellation" as defined in Section 2-106.
The Statue of Frauds provisions of this Article are expressly applied to modifications by subsection (3).
Under those provisions the "delivery and acceptance"
test is limited to goods which have been accepted, that is,
to the past. "Modification" for the future cannot therefore be conjured up by oral testimony if the price involved is $500.00 or more since such modification must
be shown at least by an authenticated memo. And since
a memo is limited in its effect to the quantity of goods set
65
forth in it there is safeguard against oral evidence.
Professor Eisler recognizes that the language of § 2-209(3)
merely requires satisfaction of any one of the § 2-201 provisions
if the contract as modified is within its provisions. However, the
drafters intended subsection (3) "to protect against false allegations of oral modifications." 66 To effectuate that purpose, comment 3 requires that " '[m]odification' for the future cannot
therefore be conjured up by oral testimony if the price involved is
$500 or more since such modification must be shown at least by
an authenticated memo." 67 Having abandoned the attempt to
discover the intention of the Article 2 drafters, Professor Eisler
special statute requiring any modification to be in writing. For a discussion of
special statutes, see generally 2 A. CORBIN, supra note 16, § 301. Absent such a
special statute, the common-law position concerning modifications has consistently examined the contract as modified and then applied the statute of frauds to
the modified contract. See cases collected at id. § 304; see also id. § 301, at 89 n.2
(suggesting that § 2-209(3) is consistent with general law of contracts).
64. Professor Eisler states, "An attempt to find a legislative 'intent' may
prove to be fruitless beyond the 'intent' of the drafters." Eisler, supra note 6, at
295 n.72 (citing Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REv. 863, 870-84
(1930)).
65. U.C.C. § 2-209 comment 3 (1978).
66. Id.
67. Id.
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finds an inconsistency between the language of § 2-209(3) and
the comment. She illustrates the inconsistency with a hypothetical. A buyer and seller have a written contract for 100 items at
$10 per item. Before the date of delivery, the parties agree to a
good faith modification of the price term, increasing it to $12 per
item. Since § 2-209(1) permits a good faith modification without
consideration, if § 2-209(3) is satisfied, the modification is enforceable. Under the language of subsection (3), § 2-201 is satisfied. Professor Eisler, however, believes that comment 3 will not
permit that result because the modification itself is not shown by
"an authenticated memo" required by comment 3.68
This analysis is unsound. Professor Eisler reads comment 3
selectively. Section 2-209(3) was designed "to protect against
false allegations of oral modifications" and this protection would
prevent enforcement of an oral modification "conjured up by oral
testimony." The first sentence of the second paragraph of comment 3, however, restates the common understanding of the
"contract as modified" language in § 2-209(3), i.e., "[t]he Statute
of Frauds provisions of this Article are expressly applied to modifications under subsection (3)."69 Contrary to Professor Eisler's
analysis, "provisions" would include all of the provisions of § 2201, and the comment could not be more certain in terms of the
"express" application of such provisions to modifications. The
remainder of the second paragraph of comment 3 deals with only
one of the provisions of § 2-201, the "delivery and acceptance"
test, and distinguishes the obvious situation in which the buyer,
for example, has accepted goods in excess of the quantity evidenced by the original writing and there is oral testimony of an
alleged modification of the quantity term. The enforceability of
the contract would be limited to the quantity set forth in the original writing unless, again, one of the provisions of § 2-201, such as
the "delivery and acceptance" provision, would permit enforcement of a contract with a greater quantity because that quantity
had already been accepted. This distinction in the second paragraph of comment 3 is clearly illustrative of only one of the provisions of § 2-201 because the first sentence of that paragraph,
again, insists that all § 2-201 provisions apply to § 2-209(3).7o
Contrary to Professor Eisler's analysis, therefore, there is no basis
68. See Eisler, supra note 6, at 287-88.
69. U.C.C. § 2-209 comment 3 (1978) (emphasis added). For the full text
of comment 3, see supra text accompanying note 65.
70. See U.C.C. § 2-209 comment 3 (1978). For a discussion of the relevant
provisions of § 2-201, see supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
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for any finding of inconsistency between the language of § 2209(3) and comment 3. Furthermore, it is obvious that a comment cannot prevail over the language of the statute. Early in her
piece, Professor Eisler makes note of the subservience of Code
comments. 7' Yet, she insists that § 2-209(3) be interpreted in accordance with comment 3,72 notwithstanding her contention that
the subsection and the comment are inconsistent.
Beyond the interpretation or construction of § 2-209(3) and
its comment, it is important to consider the holistic assertion that,
"[t]he writing requirement also performs the three functions of a
legal formality" 73 as a substitute for consideration. This notion
was put to rest more than a quarter of a century ago by Professor
Farnsworth:
Three possible functions [of a statute of frauds] are commonly suggested: (1) a cautionary, (2) a channeling, and
(3) an evidentiary function. The first of these has as its
goal the discouragement of bargains hastily entered
upon and is well illustrated by the provision requiring a
writing for a promise to pay the debt of another. While
there may be some ground for the belief that the requirement of a writing in the case of a contract for sale of
goods has a healthy in terrorem effect by encouraging buyers and sellers to keep written records, it is doubtful that
this is one of its primary purposes, for it is generally held
that the required memorandum need not have been
made with the intent to be bound or even to make a
memorandum, and even a repudiation may satisfy the
statute. Any cautionary function is thus only incidental
to the real ends of the statute. Nor is a principal end of
the statute as to the sale of goods the channeling of
transactions so as to make it easy to identify those agreements which are legally enforceable. This may be a substantial function of the statute as to sales of land, but the
statute as to sales of goods may be satisfied not only by a
memorandum but also by part payment or by receipt and
71. See Eisler, supra note 6, at 279 n.6. Professor Eisler suggests the inclusion of "good faith" in U.C.C. § 2-209(1) because, if the good faith requirement
is "substantive" and not already imposed under U.C.C. § 1-203 which seems to
deal only with performance or enforcement as contrasted with formation, then
"the good-faith requirement should have been enacted as part of subsection (1);
otherwise, the comment does not have the force of law." Id.
72. Id. at 296.
73. Id. at 297.
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acceptance, and from the thousands of cases in which the
parties have brought before the courts their controversies as to these requirements, the channel must indeed
be a murky one.
If the cautionary and channeling effects are negligible, the justification of a Statute of Frauds as to the sale
of goods must be today, just as it was in the time of its
origin in 1677, its evidentiary function, the prevention of
fraudulent claims. And on one point most would
agree-that the statute is not intended to deny enforcement to agreements admittedly made but lacking in the
74
required formalities.
The holistic analysis does not suggest any basis for its assertion
that a writing requirement fulfills the cautionary and channeling
as well as the evidentiary functions with respect to the statute of
frauds concerning contracts to sell goods. Moreover, by accepting two alternate satisfaction devices (reliance and
merchants' confirmations) with the express recognition that
neither device fulfills the cautionary or channeling functions while
expressly rejecting the admission device because it does not serve
these functions, the holistic analysis begins to disintegrate. When
we add to this growing list of inconsistencies the fact that the
analysis is predicated entirely upon a questionable interpretation
of a comment to the section which should not control the statutory language, the disintegration appears complete. We must,
however, return to the fundamental question of the original design of § 2-209 and wonder, again, whether the drafters contemplated a § 2-209 predicated upon the holistic analysis, i.e., should
the dilution of the preexisting duty rule in § 2-209(1) be viewed
as an integral part of the remainder of § 2-209, or did the drafters
merely find a convenient place in Article 2 to deal with the preexisting duty question? To discover an answer to this threshold
question, it is important to consider the origins of the section as
early as 1941 when the drafters were intent upon revising the
Uniform Sales Act.
The 1941 draft of the Revised Uniform Sales Act contained
§ 3-J, captioned "Offers to Modify," which was designed to ascertain that such offers be communicated in a fashion reasonably appropriate to reach the attention of an agent of the offeree who
74. A.

FARNSWORTH, NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMM'N REP. RECOMMENDA-

259-60 (1960) (footnotes omitted) (study of New York Statute of Frauds with particular reference to the U.C.C. Statute of Frauds § 2-201).

TIONS AND STUDIES
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would have the power to assent to such a modification. The "reasonably appropriate" communication was necessary to activate an
earlier section, § 3-G, permitting acceptance of such an offer by
silence. It was also necessary to activate a portion of § 4 (the statute of frauds) that would permit confirmation of an oral modification to be effective against a party who had not signed any writing
if that party did not "dissent" from such confirmation within ten
days. The comment to § 3-J dealing with offers to modify is
revealing:
This section relates to the same subject-matter as one
part of Section 4 [the statute of frauds], which latter
should probably be modified, the whole material being
treated here. If, moreover, the consideration aspects of
modification are dealt with, that will mean an elaboration
75
at this point in the Draft.
The comment reveals the intention of the drafters to deal
with the oral modification problem apart from "the Consideration
aspects of modification."' 76 If the pre-existing duty rule were
modified, that change would be inserted in this section. It is clear
that the drafters of Article 2 confronted the question of the writing requirement for modifications regardless of the consideration
question, and they did not envision an holistic analysis. Section 4
of the draft also reveals an intention to apply the exception of
current § 2-201(2) ("between merchants a writing not objected to
within ten days will be effective against the non-signer") 7 7 to oral
modifications as well as confirmations of the original oral contract. The quoted comment to § 3-J clearly reveals some indecision as to where the question of modifications and the statute of
frauds should be placed. The inclusion of the current § 2-201(2)
exception with respect to modifications in the 1941 section dealing with the statute of frauds may be seen as supporting the view
that the current § 2-209(3) should be construed as Professors Pat75. Report and Second Draft of the Revised Uniform Sales Act of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 81 (Indianapolis
1941).

76. Id.
77. Id. The full text of § 2-201(2) provides:
Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the contract and sufficient against the sender is received and
the party receiving it has reason to know its contents, it satisfies the
requirements of subsection (1) against such party unless written notice
of objection to its contents is given within 10 days after it is received.
U.C.C. § 2-201(2) (1978).
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terson, Corbin and many others have construed it, i.e., the simple
requirement that the "contract as modified" must meet any § 2201 requirement. That construction automatically incorporates
all of the exceptions (or alternate satisfaction devices) under § 2201 for oral modifications. Thus, there is no need to restate
those exceptions separately in the modification section. In the
subsequent drafting history of § 2-209, there is no indication of
any contrary intention. Rather, § 2-209(3) is consistently treated
as if it is a well-known concept that the drafters merely intended
to codify. Again, Professor Patterson thought it may be
78
superfluous.
IV.

THE SCOPE AND APPLICATION OF SECTION

A.

2-209(3)

Scope

Except for those who believe that § 2-209(3) has something
to do with validation devices as well as the statute of frauds, the
conventional wisdom concerning the scope of § 2-209(3) recognizes five possibilities: 1) if the original contract is within § 2-20 1,
any modification must be evidence by a writing; 2) a modification
must be in writing if the added term brings it within § 2-201 for
the first time; 3) a modification must be in writing if the modification, itself, is within § 2-201; 4) a modification changing the quantity term must be in writing; 5) some combination of the
foregoing. 79 The language of § 2-209(3) cannot be understood
absent a clear understanding of the effect of a modification
agreement.
A modification agreement involves two analytically distinct
operative effects: 1) the termination or rescission of the original
contract and 2) the creation of a new contract. 8 0 The typical modification incorporates both effects simultaneously in an entire (indivisible) contract so that the resulting (second) contract contains
part of the terms of the original contract and the new terms. 8 '
There has never been any question that "the new contract is
78. For Professor Patterson's view concerning the superfluousness of § 2209(3), see supra note 12, at 643-44.
79. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 1-5, at 42-43 (listing these
possibilities); Hillman, supra note 5, at 359-60 (same). Professor Farnsworth is
unimpressed with the possibilities suggested by the commentators. See A.
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 377 n.23 (1982)("The seemingly simple language of

UCC 2-209(3) has been given a remarkable variety of interpretations.").
80. See Patterson, supra note 12, at 643; 2 A. CORBIN, supra note 16, § 303.
81. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 149 (1979).
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viewed as a whole," 8 2 i.e., "the contract as modified." Professor
Corbin is particularly clear in his directive that: "The second
agreement is within the statute if these two parts, taken together,
make a contract that would be within the statute if it had been the
only executory contract that the parties had made, otherwise
not."813 This clarification is very helpful in understanding the
scope and application of § 2-209(3).
If our exclusive concern is the modified contract, i.e., if we
treat that contract as the only one the parties had made, we can
determine the application of § 2-201 to the modified contract
simply by applying § 2-201 to it as if there were no prior contract.
This interpretation is in accordance with considerable pre-Code
case law and, as suggested earlier, there is no basis for assuming
any intention to depart from pre-Code analyses of the "contract
as modified." Among the numerous cases supporting this analysis outside the Code, one finds an oral contract that could not be
performed within one year from its making that was orally modified so that the contract as modified could be performed within
one year from its making. The statute of frauds was inapplicable
84
to the contract as modified; therefore, it was enforceable.
Moreover, it would have made no difference if the original contract had been in writing and enforceable since the enforceability
of the original contract is irrelevant.8 5 Again, we focus exclusively
on the contract as modified and that focus provides a workable
analysis of the scope of § 2-209(3). An oral modification is enforceable if it deals exclusively with a part of the original written
contract that was not within the statute of frauds. If the written
evidence of the original contract is sufficient to satisfy the statute
of frauds with respect to the modified contract, pre-Code or extra-Code case law supports the view that the modification need
not be evidenced by a writing. 86 Similarly, if the statute could
have been satisfied by statutory devices alternative to a writing
with respect to the original contract, the same satisfaction devices
82. Id. at comment a (citing U.C.C. § 2-209(3) (1978)).
83. 2 A. CORBIN, supra note 16, § 304, at 97 (emphasis added).
84. See Flowood Corp. v. Chain, 247 Miss. 443, 152 So. 2d 915 (1963).
85. See, e.g.,
Sherman, Clay & Co. v. Buffum & Pendleton, Inc., 91 Or. 352,
179 P. 241 (1919) (oral modification of two year lease not required to be evidenced by writing because the contract as modified was not within statute of
frauds).
86. See 2 A. CORBIN, supra note 16, § 304, at 100. Professor Corbin states:
"Thus, where the statute expressly provides that the consideration need not be
expressed in the writing, a change in the consideration can be effected orally."
Id.
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were available for the modified contract. 8 7 If § 2-209(3) does not
change the pre-Code concept that the "contract as modified"
must satisfy the statute of frauds, how has § 2-209(3) been
applied?
B.

Application

Notwithstanding the preceding analysis of pre-Code law, the
conventional wisdom suggests that one possible interpretation of
§ 2-209(3) would require any modification to be evidenced by a
writing, i.e., even one dealing with a term that § 2-201 would not
require to be evidenced by a writing.8 8 Section 2-201 only requires "some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale
has been made between the parties and signed by the party
against whom enforcement is sought."8 9 While the text of the
statute does not provide an elaboration of a "sufficient" writing,
comment 1 is particularly helpful. 90 There is a tendency to suggest that the only term which need be stated is the quantity term,
and there is even an argument that a writing without any quantity
87.
An oral modification of a contract for the sale of goods by the substitution of different or additional goods is within the statute if the contract
as modified would have been within the statute had it been the only
contract made; but if there has been acceptance and receipt of goods or
a part payment under the oral contract, it becomes fully operative and
enforceable.
Id. § 305, at 101.
88. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 1-5, at 44.

89. U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (1978). The full text of this subsection provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, a contract for the sale
of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of
action or defense unless there has been some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the parties and
signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized broker or agent. A writing is not insufficient because it omits
or incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the contract is not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods shown in such
writing.
Id.
90. Comment 1 reads as follows:
The required writing need not contain all the material terms of the contract and such material terms as are stated need not be precisely stated.
All that is required is that the writing afford a basis for believing that
the offered oral evidence rests on a real transaction. It may be written
in lead pencil on a scratch pad. It need not indicate which party is the
buyer and which the seller. The only term which must appear is the
quantity term which need not be accurately stated but recovery is limited to the amount stated. The price, time and place of payment or
delivery, the general quality of the goods, or any particular warranties
may all be omitted.
U.C.C. § 2-201 comment 1 (1978).
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term may be effective. 91 Section 2-201, however, does require
more than the quantity term. The parties must be identified
(though, again, not necessarily as buyer or seller), the goods must
be sufficiently identified, the writing must be signed and, of overriding importance, the writing must afford a basis for believing
that the parties made a contract. 92 It is abundantly clear that the
drafters of Article 2 viewed the new statute of frauds for the sale
of goods as a major improvement over the technical statute of
frauds it replaced because it did not permit technical limitations
to intrude on the critical question of whether there was sufficient
evidence that the parties had made a particular deal. 9 3 If terms
such as consideration, delivery and others need not be in writing
to evidence the original contract, why should modifications of
such terms require a writing?
There is a dearth of analysis in the case law concerning the
scope of § 2-209(3). Recall the five possible interpretations of
subsection (3),94 the first suggesting that any modification would
have to be evidenced by a writing. One would be hard pressed to
find case-law support for that proposition. The case that is invariably mentioned is a Pennsylvania lower court opinion which
hardly suggests an extensive analysis of the question and which
has met with some disapproval. 9 5 Other cases do not deal with
91. SeeJ. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 2-4, at 60 n.52 (citing Riegel
Fiber Corp. v. Anderson Gin Co., 512 F.2d 784 (5th Cir. 1975)). Professors
White and Summers suggest that all of the commentators who insist that the
quantity term must be stated may be wrong, i.e., there is an alternative interpretation of U.C.C. § 2-201 suggesting that a quantity term is determinative only if
the writing states such a term. See id.
92. See U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (1978). For the text of this subsection, see supra
note 89.
93. Karl Llewellyn was particularly upset with the possibility that a party to
a contract evidenced by a writing would admit the making of a contract, but then
insist that the contract contained another term not evidenced by the writing that
had been agreed upon. If that party was believed by the trier of fact, the contract was unenforceable because the writing failed to state that term. Llewellyn
thought this was a "commercial outrage" and suggested that U.C.C. § 2-201 was
highly preferable:
We turn to the exact opposite and say, as long as you are sure you have
got a deal, go to the jury as you would in any other case, and we say the
risk is very small. You can't be sued under the memo for more than the
quantity stated, which puts a top limit on what you could be possibly
with....
1 N.Y. State Law Revision Comm'n, 1954 Report (Statement of Karl Llewellyn).
94. For a discussion of five possible interpretations of § 2-209(3), see supra
note 79 and accompanying text.
95. Asco Mining Co. v. Gross Contracting Co., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 293 (Pa.
C.P. 1965) (Callaghan) (oral modification of extension of time for payment held
within U.C.C. § 2-209(3)). Professors White and Summers indicate that the
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the scope question and proceed to consider whether an alternative statute of frauds satisfaction device is evident or whether a
"waiver" under § 2-209(4) has occurred. In Double-E Sportswear
Corp. v. Girard Trust Bank, 96 a written contract for the sale of a
certain quantity of sweaters and shirts at $11.75 per dozen provided a power of cancellation for the seller if written notice of
97
such cancellation was sent to the buyer prior to a certain date.
The buyer alleged an oral modification of the cancellation term
and the inclusion of a new agreement for sealed bids for the same
goods as well as a promise by the seller that the buyer would receive the goods if no other bid was higher. 98 Prior to the time for
submission of buyer's sealed bid, the seller sold the goods to another.9 9 In dealing with the oral modification, the concentration
was on a § 2-209(4) waiver and the possibility of buyer's reliance
thereon.' 0 0 The court was careful enough to suggest that the oral
modification was "theoretically" a statute of frauds question.' 0 '
If the parties had not included the power of cancellation in their
original writing, would the writing have been sufficient to satisfy
the § 2-201 requirements? The parties were named, the goods
were described and the quantity was certain. The price term,
though unnecessary in the writing, was stated, and the power of
cancellation was also stated. The writing would have certainly afforded "a basis for believing that the offered oral evidence
[rested] on a real transaction"' 10 2 even if the price and cancellation terms had not been included in the original writing. An oral
modification of a term that was not an essential term of the writing does not violate § 2-201, i.e., the "contract as modified" is
"court flatly stated that this [time for payment extension] violated § 2-209(3).
One of us does not concur." J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 1-5, at 45

& n.57. The statement of the court was very "flat," indeed, because it did not
elaborate the point at all. Moreover, the issue in the case was whether the trial
judge erred in charging the jury that consideration was necessary to sustain an

oral modification. See Asco, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 294. On the motion for a new
trial, the court held that the trial judge had erred. Id. at 295. It then proceeded
to "comment" on the U.C.C. § 2-209(3) question because counsel had "touched
upon" such questions and the case was to be retried. Id.

96. 488 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1973).
97. Id. at 293.
98. Id. at 293-94.
99. Id. at 294.
100. Id. at 296-98.
101. Id. at 296. The court stated that "[w]hat the bank seems to overlook is

that while an oral modification of a written agreement may theoretically be precluded, the code does explicitly provide for an oral waiver of the operation of
the Statute of Frauds." Id.
102. U.C.C. § 2-201 comment 1 (1978).
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satisfied by such a writing with no change in the parties or the
quantity term. The issue was simply not addressed in Double-E
Sportswear.10 3 Another case, Farmers Elevator Co. v. Anderson,104 involved an oral agreeement for the purchase and sale of wheat to
be delivered in February, 1973.105 The defendant admitted that
he made the original oral contract and his admission satisfied the
statute of frauds under the judicial admission satisfaction device. 10 6 The plaintiff also alleged an oral modification extending
the delivery date. 10 7 The court resorted to § 2-209(4) and course
of performance evidence to find a basis for enforcing the modifi08
cation since the defendant did not admit the modification.1
Since the modification dealt with the delivery date (a term not
required to be evidenced by a writing under § 2-201), was the
modification within § 2-201 ab initio? A judicial admission of an
oral agreement need contain no terms beyond the frugal terms
required to be in writing under § 2-201(1).109 Thus, treating the
admission as if it were a writing containing the terms admitted,
there would appear to be no need to consider the statute of
frauds concerning a modification of a term not required to be evidenced in the original writing or admission under § 2-201.
Again, the scope of § 2-201 was not discussed, though the court
clearly interpreted § 2-209(3) as merely requiring satisfaction of
§ 2-201. Other cases reveal no discussion of this fundamental
scope analysis. 10 The most plausible explanation is that the
103. A case outside the Code illustrates the clarity ofjudicial decisions concerning oral modifications of terms that are not included in the writing requirement under other sections of the statute of frauds. In Childress v. C. W. Myers
Trading Post, an alleged oral modification of a contract to buy and sell real property with respect to changes in the color of tile, brick, and mortar, as well as an
extension of time for completion of the building were not within the land section
of the statute of frauds since such matters were not statutorily required to be
evidenced by a writing. 247 N.C. 150, 154, 100 S.E.2d 391, 393 (1957).
104. 170 Mont. 175, 552 P.2d 63 (1976).
105. Id. at 176, 552 P.2d at 63-64.
106. See U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(b) (1978). For the text of this section, see supra

note 52.
107. Farmers Elevator, 170 Mont. at 177, 552 P.2d at 64.
108. Id. at 179-81, 552 P.2d at 65-66.

109. See Kohlmeyer & Co. v. Bowen, 126 Ga. App. 700, 706-07, 192 S.E.2d
400, 405 (1972) (dealing with U.C.C. § 8-319 (sale of securities), a statute of
frauds section virtually identical to U.C.C. § 2-201, which the court so held); see
also Dangerfield v. Markel, 252 N.W.2d 184 (N.D. 1977)(adopting the Kohlmeyer
analysis for U.C.C. §§ 2-201 and 2-209(3) purposes).
110. See, e.g., Bone Int'l, Inc. v.Johnson, 74 N.C. App. 703, 329 S.E.2d 714
(1985). The Bone case concerned the oral modification of a disclaimer of warranty clause in the original written contract. Id. at 715. The statute of frauds
was not raised. Id. at 717. However, the court stated that, had it been raised,
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scope issue was simply not raised.
The fundamental problem in judicial treatments of § 2209(3) is that courts seem to feel that it sprung like Minerva from
the brow of Jove' requiring the most sophisticated analysis of a
theretofore unheard of concept. Yet, all of the evidence clearly
points to the wisdom of Professor Patterson's view that § 2-209(3)
may have been superfluous since it merely codified the rather extensive pre-Code case law concerning the "contract as modified.' t12 Before launching an extensive analysis of any part of the
Code, it is highly desirable to consider what preceded it. The
world of commercial law did not begin with the Uniform Commerical Code.
This analysis of § 2-209(3) is further supported by several applications of the section that confidently apply § 2-201 satisfaction devices, other than a writing signed by the party to be
charged, to modifications. The admission of an oral modification
is seen as satisfying § 2-209(3) via § 2-201(3)(b).11 3 Confirmasummary judgment would still have been improper because the defendant
presented evidence of the oral modification and his reliance thereon. Id.
Quaere: is an oral modification concerning a warranty term within the U.C.C.
§ 2-201 statute of frauds? That issue was not discussed.
The Oregon Supreme Court has found statute of frauds satisfaction for an
oral modification changing the payment term in a letter by plaintiff's president.
See Ruble Forest Products, Inc. v. Lancer Mobile Homes of Or., Inc., 269 Or.
315, 524 P.2d 1204 (1974). There was again no discussion of whether such an
oral modification was within U.C.C. § 2-201 as incorporated in § 2-209(3) ab
initio.
Perhaps the most myopic judicial effort is a federal district court case arising
in Pennsylvania in which the court affirmed a summary judgment for plaintiff
where defendant had alleged an oral modification of a payment term in the original writing. See Symbol Technologies v. Sonco, Inc., 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 407
(E.D. Pa. 1983)(Callaghan). The court concluded that the evidence was inadmissable because of (1) the parol evidence rule (albeit, the court curiously
understood the oral modification to be a subsequent agreement), (2) there was no
consideration alleged for the modification (with no mention of U.C.C. § 2209(1)), and (3) because the modification violated the statute of frauds. See id. at
409-15. In granting summary judgment, the court failed to consider relevant
precedent in Pennsylvania in which the Superior Court held the statute of frauds
to be an affirmative defense which forces either an admission or denial of the
existence of the contract. See Duffee v. Judson, 251 Pa. Super. 406, 380 A.2d
843 (1977). The court also failed to consider the scope of U.C.C. § 2-209(3) and
its incorporation of U.C.C. § 2-201.
111. This is a paraphrase of Professor Grant Gilmore's criticism of the inordinate respect given § 2-207 (the notorious "battle of the forms" section) of the
Code by scholars and courts. See Letter from Professor Gilmore to Professor
Robert Summers, reprinted in R. SPEIDEL, R. SUMMERS AND J. WHITE, COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW 54-55 (3d ed. 1981).
112. See Patterson, supra note 12, at 643-44.
113. See Dangerfield v. Markel, 252 N.W.2d 184 (N.D. 1977) (oral modification of contract admitted in court sufficient for protection against fraud).
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tions of modifications not objected to within ten days from receipt
satisfy § 2-209(3) via § 2-201(2).11 4 The special manufacture of
goods will satisfy § 2-209 via the § 2-201(3)(a) exception. 1 5 The
curiosity is that no reticence is shown by courts in attempting to
discover an alternate satisfaction device under § 2-201 for modifications, but they pay no attention to whether the contract as modified is within § 2-201, ab initio. If § 2-201 is the controlling
section to discern whether an oral modification should be enforced through alternate satisfaction devices, the threshold inquiry should be whether the contract as modified is within § 2201.
V.

NOM REQUIREMENTS:
2-209(2)

THE SATISFACTION OF
SECTION

A no oral modification (NOM) clause is often found in the
written evidence of the original contract. It is designed to protect
against fraudulent or mistaken oral testimony concerning transactions subsequent to the written contract. ' 6 The clause may simply indicate the parties' understanding that any modification of
the terms of the written contract must be evidenced by a writing, 11 7 or it may also prohibit any oral "discharge," "termination" or "rescission" of the written contract. Earlier drafts of § 2209(2) dealt only with "modifications" and "waivers."' 18 To
avoid undermining pre-Code statutes making such clauses enforceable, later drafts added "rescissions."'' 9 Absent statutory
114. See Ruble Forest Products, Inc. v. Lancer Mobile Homes of Or., Inc.,
269 Or. 315, 524 P.2d 1204 (1974); see also Monroc, Inc. v. Jack B. Parson Constr. Co., 604 P.2d 901 (Utah 1979). For a discussion of Ruble, see supra note 110.
For a discussion of Monroc, see infra note 128.
115. See S.C. Gray, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 92 Mich. App. 789, 286 N.W.2d
34 (1979)(applying § 2-201(3)(a) exception to no oral modification clause requiring any modification to be in writing pursuant to § 2-209(2)).
116. 6 A. CORBIN, supra note 16, § 1295, at 205.
117. See, e.g., Wagner v. Graziano Constr. Co., 390 Pa. 445, 136 A.2d 82
(1957). In Wagner the relevant clause read:
Without invalidating this contract the Contractor may add to or reduce
the work to be performed hereunder. No extra work or changes from
plans and specifications under this contract will be recognized or paid
for, unless agreed to in writing before the extra work is started or the
changes made, in which written order shall be specified in detail the
extra work or changes desired, the price to be paid or the amount to be
deducted should said change decrease the amount to be paid
hereunder.
Id. at 446-47, 136 A.2d at 83. Such clauses are frequently found in construction
contracts to avoid oral "change orders."
118. See, e.g., Proposed Final Draft No. 2 (Spring 1951).
119. See Patterson, supra note 12, at 643. Professor Patterson traces the his-
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protection, NOM clauses were ineffective.' 20 The statutes were
designed to make such clauses enforceable. Those who criticized
the statute of frauds, however, were equally critical of the statutory predecessors of § 2-209(2).121 Notwithstanding that criticism, § 2-209(2) permits the parties to include an enforceable
clause in their written agreement proscribing modification or re122
scission except by a signed writing.
The first thought that may occur to any lawyer considering
§ 2-209 for the first time is that § 2-209(2) supports the conventional, pre-Code interpretation of § 2-209(3). Earlier, a constructory of the New York statute. The last amendment of the statute in 1952 was
designed to overcome the result in Green v. Doniger, 300 N.Y. 238, 90 N.E.2d 56
(1949). Green permitted the parties to abandon the written contract and proceed
to make a new oral contract on different terms. By extending the statute to prohibit termination of the original written contract, oral terminations or "waivers"
of the original contract became ineffective. Professor Patterson notes that a
"modification" involves two steps: (a) the termination of the first (original written) contract, and (b) the making of a new, second contract containing some of
the original terms and the new terms. Therefore, a clause merely precluding
"modifications" would be ineffective unless it also precludes termination by oral
agreement.
120. See 6 A. CORBIN, supra note 16, § 1295, at 206-08. Professor Corbin's
treatise states that:
Any written contract, other than specialties not now being considered,
can be rescinded or varied at will by the oral agreement of the parties;
and this is held to be true, except as otherwise provided by statute,
even of a written agreement that the contract shall not be orally varied
or rescinded. Two contractors cannot by mutual agreement limit their
power to control their legal relations by future mutual agreement. Nor
can they in this manner prescribe new rules of evidence and procedure
in the proof of facts and events.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 148 comment b (198 1)("Uniform Commercial Code § 2-209(2), however, gives effect to
a signed agreement which excludes modification 'or rescission' except by a
signed writing. That provision, applicable to 'transactions in goods' (§ 2-102),
by its terms negates the rule stated in this Section."); Universal Builders, Inc. v.
Moon Motor Lodge, 430 Pa, 550, 244 A.2d 10 (1968)(nonsale of goods construction contract could be modified orally although it provided that it could
only be modified in writing).
121. See 6 A. CORBIN, supra note 16, § 1295, at 212.
Like the statute of frauds, these statutes evidence the "yearning for
certainty and repose," although as Holmes said "certainty is an illusion
and repose is not the destiny of man." They operate against the innocent and the unwary as well as against those who might cheat and defraud; and they run counter increasingly to the practices of ordinary
men in the making, modifying and performing of their agreements.
Men increasingly rely upon the spoken word, given in person or by telephone; and it is the function of the courts to do justice in such cases.
It no longer serves for the court to throw a plaintiff out of court saying,
"It was your folly not to get his signature."

Id.
122. For the full text of § 2-209(2), see supra note 14.
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tion of § 2-209(3) requiring any modification or rescission to
satisfy the § 2-201 statute of frauds was criticized. 12 3 If that construction were correct, § 2-209(2) would be a nullity since all
modifications and rescissions would have to satisfy the requirements of § 2-201. Section 2-209(3), like pre-Code constructions
of the statute of frauds requirements for modifications, however,
imposes no writing requirement on oral variations or discharges
124
unless the contract as modified is within the statute of frauds.
Thus, parties who seek protection beyond that provided by the
"public" statute of frauds-by requiring a writing for any modification or rescission-are permitted to create their own statute of
frauds, their "private" statute of frauds, through a clause requiring such modifications or rescissions to be evidence by a signed
writing. Since the common law did not enforce such clauses, § 2209(2), again, follows pre-Code statutory devices in making such
clauses enforceable. Section 2-209(2), therefore, like § 2-209(3),
did not suggest any novel, much less radical, transformation of
pre-Code contract law.' 2 5 If one of the parties had performed
("executed") in accordance with the oral modification required to
be evidenced by a writing in a jurisdiction enforcing such clauses,
courts had no difficulty in enforcing the oral modification because
of the reliance of the performing party.' 26 In a "public" statute of
frauds context, performance of either an oral contract or an oral
modification would serve the evidentiary function of the statute of
frauds to the extent of the performance and such performance is
evidence of reliance by the performing party. Should performance be sufficient to make an oral modification enforceable
notwithstanding § 2-209(2)?
The literal language of § 2-209(2) does not admit of alternate
satisfaction devices beyond a signed writing. Subsection (4), however, permits an oral modification to operate as a waiver and a
comment insists that the waiver provision is designed, inter alia, to
123. See supra note 68-69 and accompanying text.
124. See 6 A. CORBIN, supra note 16, § 1295, at 205.
125. Professor Corbin predicted that § 2-209(4), permitting reliance on the
oral modification to make it enforceable, would prevent § 2-209(2) "from causing very serious injustice." 6 A. CORBIN, supra note 16, § 1295, at 211.
126. See, e.g., D. L. Godbey & Sons Const. Co. v. Deane, 39 Cal. 2d 429, 246
P.2d 946 (1962)(full performance of oral modification to cement work contract
held to be adequate consideration for relinquishment of reciprocal rights of parties under original contract); Velveray Corp. v.Jolo Plastic Corp., 19 A.D.2d 69,
241 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1963)(construing N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAw § 133(c) (McKinney
1964)(repealed 1976)), aff'd, 13 N.Y.2d 1165, 196 N.E.2d 738, 247 N.Y.S.2d 389
(1964).
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prevent NOM clauses "from limiting in other respects the legal
effects of the parties' actual later conduct." 127 There is nothing in
the drafting history of § 2-209(2) to suggest any departure from
pre-Code satisfactions of NOM clauses through performance/reliance. The question arises: should any satisfaction device that would meet the requirements of § 2-209(3), i.e.,
alternate satisfaction devices under § 2-201, also satisfy the requirements of § 2-209(2)? A relatively simple example will aid
the exploration of this question.
Assume a contract for the sale of goods within the statute of
frauds evidenced by a sufficient writing that also includes an
NOM clause. Next, assume an oral modification of that contract
within § 2-209(3), i.e., that must satisfy § 2-201 as well as the
"private" statute of frauds the parties have imposed by their
NOM clause. A sufficient memorandum of the oral modification
would satisfy both the "public" and "private" statutes of frauds.
Absent a writing signed by the party to be charged, if the parties
were merchants, would a writing signed by A and received by B
without objection for ten days beyond receipt satisfy the NOM
clause as well as § 2-209(3)? The purpose of this satisfaction device under § 2-201(2) is to avoid the pre-Code possibility that the
non-signer could speculate at the expense of the signer, i.e., to
bind the signer and permit the non-signer to decide whether he
wants the contract to be enforceable. To suggest that this device
would satisfy § 2-209(3) but not § 2-209(2) would perpetuate the
evil that § 2-201(2) was designed to avoid. Moreover, unlike the
original § 2-201 situation where such a writing could be sent by a
party who had no previous relation with the non-signer, the modification situation clearly evidences a contractual relationship between the parties via the original writing containing the NOM
clause. Thus, an unanswered writing evidencing a modification of
the contract should provide sufficient protection "against false allegations of oral modifications."' 12 8 If a sufficient confirmation of
127. U.C.C. § 2-209 comment 4 (1978).
128. U.C.C. § 2-209 comment 3. See In re Estate of Upchurch, 62 Tenn.
App. 639, 466 S.W.2d 886 (1971). In Upchurch a seller's letter, even though
subsequent to the formation of the contract, was held to be sufficient evidence of
the modification notwithstanding an NOM clause. Id. at 892. But see Monroc,
Inc. v. Jack E. Parson Constr. Co., 604 P.2d 901 (Utah 1979). In Monroc the
defendant insisted upon a literal interpretation of U.C.C. § 2-209(2), i.e., that
only a writing signed by the defendant would satisfy the NOM clause in the original writing. Id. at 904. The trial court held that a paragraph in the purchase
order reading, "Claims for extras positively will not be allowed unless ordered
in writing" was not, under these circumstances, an effective NOM clause. Id. at
904-05. The appellate court sustained that ruling. Id. at 905. The plaintiff had
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an oral modification is effective to satisfy § 2-209(3),129 the same
policy reasons supporting that satisfaction device should be effective to satisfy § 2-209(2). Similarly, if the defendant admits the
modification in his pleadings, testimony or otherwise in court,
why should such a party be permitted to preclude enforcement of
the modification through an NOM clause any more than he would
be permitted to rely upon a § 2-201 defense after admitting an
oral modification? Such a holding would be the epitome of a
technical defense undermining the factual bargain of the parties
without the slightest possibility of a false allegation of
modification.
If the parties perform an oral modification that violates their
NOM clause, there has never been any doubt that the executed
modification is enforceable. Yet, even where it is clear that the
parties have modified their agreement without a writing, courts
have found comfort in the waiver analysis. In Gold Kist, Inc. v.
Pillow 130 the soybean buyer formed several contracts with the
seller at prices varying from $5.59 per bushel to $7.22 per
bushel.' 3 1 The contracts contained NOM clauses and also stipulated that the delivery of the soybeans would be applied first to
the contract with the earliest date until delivery of that contract
was completed, and then to subsequent contracts in chronologi33
cal order. 3 2 The earliest contracts called for the lowest prices.1
argued that a confirmation of the oral modification, sent by plaintiff, satisfied
either U.C.C. § 2-209(2) or 2-209(3). Id. On the assumption that the clause was
an effective NOM clause, the appellate court stated that it would have found
another writing, signed by defendant, to be sufficient to satisfy the § 2-209(2)
requirement, i.e., inferentially, the plaintiff's confirmation would not have been
sufficient. See id. at 906.
In a Seventh Circuit case the court stated that certain writings giving new
delivery dates, sent by the seller to the buyer were insufficient writings since they
did not purport to modify the contract and were not signed by the pruchaser.
Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1284-85 (7th
Cir. 1986). Though new delivery dates were not expressly designated by the
seller as a modification of the contract, the statute of frauds should be satisfied
by sufficient evidence of the parties' agreement. Id. at 1285. For a discussion of
Wisconsin Knife Works, see infra notes 160-234 and accompanying text. Cf Rockland Indus. v. Frank Kasmir Assocs., 470 F. Supp. 1176 (N.D. Tex. 1979)(a sufficient confirmation need not expressly state that it is a confirmation.); Reich v.
Helen Harper, Inc., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1048 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1966)(disputatious
confirmation held sufficient)(cited in J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 59).
129. See A & G Constr. Co. v. Reid Bros. Logging Co., 547 P.2d 1207
(Alaska 1976).
130. 582 S.W.2d 77 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979).
131. Id. at 78.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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The plaintiff-buyer alleged an oral modification prompted by the
seller's request that his deliveries be applied to the later, higherpriced contracts because he nceded the money.' 3 4 The buyer
agreed and paid the higher prices on earlier deliveries. 13 5 The
defendant then refused to perform the remaining contract calling
for lower prices.' 3 6 The court stated that it would be "repulsive"
to permit a party to request a change in terms of payment and
then to escape liability because the other party had, in good faith,
granted the request. 137 The conduct of the defendant in this case
38
cries out for an application of the waiver/estoppel analysis.'
Yet, the fact that the plaintiff made and defendant accepted payments in excess of the terms of the writing suggests reliable
course of performance evidence which could be viewed as an alternate satisfaction device making the oral modification
enforceable.
In summary, there is no justification for a refusal to recognize
any alternate satisfaction device under § 2-201 with respect to
NOM clauses if the purpose of § 2-209(2) is kept in mind. Any of
those devices provides a reliable basis for enforcing an oral modification notwithstanding an NOM clause.
VI.

MODIFICATIONS BECOME WAIVERS

It is vitally important to consider the language of § 2-209(4):
"Although an attempt at modification ...does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (2) or (3) it can operate as a waiver." In
this part of the article, we seek to discover the true meaning of the
infamous it.
There are too many meanings attached to the term
"waiver." 139 Such an assertion is often followed by the commonly
accepted definition, "a voluntary relinquishment of a known
4
right." 40 This common definition is, however, misleading.' ' It
134. Id. at 78-79.
135. Id. at 79.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 80.
138. For a discussion of the waiver/estoppel analysis, see infra note 139-67
and accompanying text.
139. Meanings of the term were the subject of study in the early part of this
century. See J. EWART, WAIVER DISTRIBUTED AMONG THE DEPARTMENTS: ELECTION, ESTOPPEL, CONTRACT, RELEASE (1917). Professor Corbin states that the
term "has been given various definitions; the fact is that it is used under many
varying circumstances." 3A A. CORBIN, supra note 16, § 752, at 478.
140. See, e.g., Van Der Broeke v. Bellanca Aircraft Corp., 576 F.2d 582 (5th
Cir. 1978); Farmers Elevator Co. of Reserve v. Anderson, 170 Mont. 175, 552

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1987

33

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 1
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32: p. I

is because it implies that one can be said to terminate or discharge a right by "waiving" it. It is possible to relinquish a known
right voluntarily in numerous ways including a gratuitous termination. Such a relinquishment, however, is not a waiver even
though the correlative duty is discharged. 4 2 It would have been
highly desirable to restrict the use of "waiver" to those situations
in which it clearly applies, i.e., the elimination of a condition (express, implied or constructive) to the duty to which it is attached.
First-year law students learn that where conditions are present,
they must occur to activate the duty which lies dormant until the
condition occurs. A party may choose to perform a duty even
though a condition has not occurred. A performance that must
precede the performance of the other party is a constructive condition precedent to that performance. A duty of a party to sell
goods may not be activated until a certain payment is made by a
certain date. For example, the original contract may have included a buyer's duty of pre-payment by a certain date. The failure of the buyer to make the payment on time is a breach of the
buyer's duty created by his promise to make the payment by that
date, but it is also the failure of a constructive condition because
the same event is a promise and a condition or, as it is often
called, a promissory condition. The failure to make the pre-payment on time may or may not be a material breach discharging
the duty of the seller. It is, however, a constructive condition precedent to the seller's duty and its non-occurrence fails to activate
that duty.
Even though the seller's duty has not been activated, the
seller may still decide to perform; the seller may ignore the fact
that his duty has not been activated. If, prior to the pre-payment
date, the seller informs the buyer that the buyer need not make
the precedent payment on time, the condition to the seller's duty
may be eliminated by this unilateral announcement. It is important to emphasize the character of this announcement-it is not
an agreement; rather, it is a promise or representation by the
seller that the seller will not insist upon the performance of the
P.2d 63 (1976); Clark v. West, 193 N.Y. 349, 86 N.E. 1 (1908), aff'd, 201 N.Y.
569, 95 N.E. 1125 (1911).
141. The definition is misleading because it suggests that one can simply
"waive" a right unilaterally as contrasted with waiving a condition to a duty, and
it is also misleading in that it may suggest that the promisor must "know" the
legal effect of his promise as contrasted with his simply knowing the essential
facts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 84 comment b (1981).
142. Id.
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pre-payment duty that constitutes the occurrence of a constructive condition precedent to activate his duty. Just as a promise
may be enforceable without consideration, if the seller's promise
or representation concerning the condition caused the buyer to
change his position in reasonable reliance that he need not make
the pre-payment on time, the seller will be precluded from asserting the failure of the constructive condition as a justification for
his failure to perform. We will say that the seller is "estopped"
from asserting the failure of the condition and we might add that
the condition has been "waived." As in other detrimental reliance situations, however, neither the conclusory term "waiver"
nor the similarly conclusory term "estoppel" explains the holding. Rather, it is the justifiable reliance by the prospective buyer
that eliminates the condition to the seller's duty. It is possible for
the seller to reinstate such a condition prior to the time for its
occurrence by reasonable notice to the buyer that the seller will
insist upon the original pre-payment on time. If there has been
no reliance on the "waiver" that would make performance of the
pre-payment condition burdensome to the buyer, the condition
may be reinstated or, as it may be commonly suggested, the
waiver may be withdrawn or revoked. The operation of "waiver"
and "estoppel" have an existence separate and apart from the
"public" statute of frauds or the parties' "private" statute of
143
frauds created by NOM clauses in their original contracts.
If the parties had agreed to change the precedent payment
date and the seller received consideration for this modification,
there would be no question concerning the validity of this substitute agreement. It is still possible to characterize this modification as a "waiver" but there would be no possiblility of retraction
of the waiver since consideration supports the promise to forego
143. 2 A. CORBIN, supra note 16, § 310, at 113-15. Professor Corbin states:
Where some performance by the plaintiff... is a condition precedent, and the failure of the plaintiff to render such performance is
caused by the defendant and not by the plaintiff's own inability, the
failure to perform that condition is not a good defense in a suit upon
the contract. This would be so in the cases of contracts not within the
statute of frauds; and it is equally so of contracts that are in writing and
are required to be so by the statute. Waiver of conditions and estoppel
to assert them are subjects that are fully considered in dealing with contracts quite independently of the statute of frauds; and it is not necessary to discuss either "waiver" or "estoppel" at this point. It is only
necessary to insist that there is nothing in the statute of frauds to prevent them from being fully operative in the usual way.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Professor Corbin believed the U.C.C. § 2-209 simply
incorporated the principles of waiver/estoppel. See id. § 310, at 112 n.53.
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the condition. It is possible to have a modification that operates
as a waiver. If there were no consideration for the promise to
forego the condition, but the promisee reasonably relied, again,
the waiver would be irrevocable because of the reliance. The curiosity of this analysis when applied to § 2-209, however, is the
fact that a modification needs no consideration or other validation device to be binding under § 2-209(1). It may, therefore,
seem appropriate to suggest that § 2-209 modifications that operate as waivers need no validation device to make them enforceable. Neither consideration nor reliance is essential if the
modification/waiver occurred in good faith. While this construction may be compatible with § 2-209(4)-which permits oral
modifications violating subsections (2) and (3) to operate as waivers-it is irreconcilable with § 2-209(5) that permits reinstatement of waived terms absent reliance. We are left with a mystery:
if § 2-209(1) removes any consideration or reliance requirement,
why should a term (condition) that was eliminated by our oral
modification/waiver be subject to reinstatement absent reliance?
Our solution to this mystery begins with the distinction between modifications and waivers. Section 2-209(1) eliminates the
need for a validation device to make a modification agreement enforceable. This section, however, does not eliminate the need for
consideration or reliance to make a waiver irrevocable. Yet, this
may only appear to create another riddle. If the same event needs
no validation device when it is characterized as a modification but
does require a validation device when characterized as a waiver,
why not simply enforce it as a modification agreement where
there is no validation device and ignore the fact that it also operates as a waiver? The question scarcely survives its statement.
The absence of a validation device will not preclude enforcement
of a modification. The statute of frauds or an NOM clause, however, will preclude the enforcement of a modification that does
not satisfy those requirements. If our modification is so precluded, as a modification, it is unenforceable. However, an unenforceable modification ("an attempt at modification [that] does not
satisfy the requirements of subsection (2) or (3)"), "can operate
as a waiver."' 44 It is not a waiver. It is an oral modification that
fails to satisfy the requirements of the NOM clause or § 2-201. So
characterized, it will not be enforceable. It can, however, operate
as a waiver if it meets the requirements of a waiver although it was
144. See U.C.C. § 2-209(4) (1978). For the full text of this subsection, see
supra note 27.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol32/iss1/1

36

Murray: The Modification Mystery: Section 2-209 of the Uniform Commercial

1987]

MODIFICATION MYSTERY

created by an agreement and is not the voluntary action of the
obligor, alone. Once we leave the land of modifications, we are
no longer immune from the requirement of a validation device to
support the voluntary act of surrendering a condition to the activation of one's duty. Waivers are not irrevocable absent a validation device unless the time for the occurrence of the condition has
passed and the term waived is not a material part of the agreed
exchange. 14 5 There is nothing in Article 2 or elsewhere in the
Code that suggests any change in the pre-Code or extra-Code law
governing waivers, including waivers arising from modification
agreements. The concept is not used in any strange or novel
fashion. Comment 4 to § 2-209 suggests the basic notion of the
drafters to avoid any interference with that pre-Code law so as to
give "legal effect [to] the parties' later conduct." The simple concept may be stated as follows: even though the parties have not
satisfied their own NOM clause or the "public" statute of frauds,
their oral modification may be viewed as a waiver of a term of the
original contract that may be reinstated unless reliance would
prevent such reinstatement.
It is important to emphasize that this analysis is not designed
to allow for the enforcement of the unenforceable oral modification by playing characterization games. A modification will not be
enforced under the guise of "waiver." Nor will the oral modification be enforced as a substitute agreement when it violates either
the "public" statute of frauds or the parties' NOM clause. The
oral modification, however, though not enforceable as an executory oral modification, may provide evidence giving rise to reasonable reliance by one party, thereby estopping the other party
from insisting upon the enforcement of an original contract term
which should not be enforced as a condition to the duty of the
estopped party. The rationale is based exclusively on reliance: to
permit the enforcement of the original contract term would be
unjust in view of the other party's change of position. The clearest example of this kind of situation would occur where there has
been some delay in performance caused by the other party. If a
buyer requests a seller to delay shipment of the goods and the
seller thereby delays delivery, it would be horrendous to permit
the buyer to defend an action by the seller on the original con145. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 84 (1981). Section 84 of
the Restatement (Second) deals with waiver in terms of the elimination of conditions. If a waiver of a condition occurs prior to the time for its occurrence, absent consideration or reliance it may be reinstated if notice is given and there is a
reasonable time for the conditioning event to occur. Id.
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tract on the basis of a failed tender to deliver in accordance with
the precise time of delivery. Absent evidence that the seller could
not have delivered at the original time, the situation screams for
the elimination of the original time of delivery term.14 6 Suppose,
however, the parties not only agreed upon a delay in delivery, but
also agreed orally to a change in the goods to be delivered or to a
different quantity of goods to be delivered. The pre-Code concept of waiver would not permit the enforcement of the oral modification concerning the substitution of different goods or a
quantity change though, again, the waiver of the delivery term
47
through the reliance of the seller should have been recognized. 1
If § 2-209(4) and (5) are nothing more than codifications of the
pre-Code concept of waiver/estoppel, there is no possibility of
enforcing an otherwise unenforceable oral modification simply by
calling it a "waiver" under § 2-209(4) which has been made irrevocable by reliance under § 2-209(5). The delineation between an
unenforceable oral modification and a waiver is suggested in an
earlier comment to § 2-209:
Subsection (5) allows retraction of a waiver with reference to the future, subject always to the qualification of
reasonable notice and other avoidance of injustice. To
limit this estoppel phase to its proper purpose, this Article gives preference in any case of doubt to the "waiver"
construction as against that of unauthenticated
"modification."14 8
It is more than likely that this comment was designed to overcome the kinds of cases that Professor Corbin had criticizedcases that failed to recognize the possibility of a waiver/estoppel
arising from an otherwise unenforceable oral modification. 1 49
146. See Gold Kist, 582 S.W.2d at 77. For a discussion of Gold Kist, see supra
notes 130-37 and accompanying text.
147. But see Clark v. Fey, 121 N.Y. 470, 24 N.E. 703 (1890). In Clark, an oral
modification at the buyer's request provided for a delay in delivery and the substitution of other goods. The court refused to permit the seller to recover on
the contract because of his delay in tender. Id. at 474-75, 24 N.E. 703-04. Professor Corbin is critical of this case and points out that the delay in delivery was
caused by the buyer who should be "estopped" to rely on the original contract
delivery term. He does, however, agree with the Clark court's refusal to enforce
the oral modification for the substitution of different goods since that new contract has nothing to do with waiving a term of the original agreement because of
the reliance of the seller. 2 A. CORBIN, supra note 16, § 310, at 118-19 & n.67.
148. Comment 5 to the 1949 Draft of Uniform Commercial Code as found
in VI E. KELLY, supra note 19, at 79. For the full text of § 2-209, see supra note
31.
149. For a discussion of Professor Corbin's critique, see supra note 141.
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The comment, however, does not suggest any expansion of the
normal operation of "waiver." Professor Corbin viewed the 1950
draft of § 2-209 as nothing more than a codification of the preCode waiver/estoppel analysis' 50 and Professor Patterson's elaboration suggests no change from conventional views of
waiver/estoppel. 15' His initial remark concerning § 2-209(4) has
often been quoted: "This subsection opens the big back door on
subsection (3)."152 This may have suggested to some that a § 2-

209(4) waiver would be a powerful device to circumvent the requirement of written modifications. The analysis following this
opening statement, however, clearly reveals nothing more than
the typical waiver/estoppel analysis with a discussion of a New
1 53
York case and a commendation of the concurring opinion.
Why did Professor Patterson think this was such a "big back
door?" Since he was committed to the view that § 2-209(3)
merely required satisfaction of § 2-201 if the contract as modified
were within § 2-201,154 it is difficult to conceive of a situation
where the traditional waiver/estoppel concept would assist a
party to overcome the § 2-201 statute of frauds requirement. If a
time of delivery term is changed through an oral modification and
the seller relies upon that change, is the waiver/estoppel device
critically important to achieve a just result? Consider the Restatement (Second) of Contracts in its illustration governed by the Code:
A and B contract in writing that A will sell specific goods
to B for $1,000, delivery to be made in 30 days and payment in 60 days. Ten days later B orally requests that
delivery be delayed until 45 days, and A so delays in reliance on the request. The delay is not a breach of A's
55
duty and does not excuse B from performing.
150. See 2 A. CORBIN, supra note 16, § 310, at 112 n.53.
151. See the statement of Professor Patterson, supra note 12, at 644-45.
152. Id. at 644.
153. See Imperator Realty Co. v. Tull, 228 N.Y. 447, 127 N.E. 263 (1923).
The Imperator case involved a contract to exchange realty where the defendant
had refused to convey because the plaintiff had failed to pay all municipal fines
relating to the land as required by the contract. Id. at 449-50, 127 N.E. at 26364. An oral modification permitted the parties to post the amount of the fines
with the title company before conveyance. Id. at 450, 127 N.E. at 264. In a
concurring opinion, Judge Cardozo found a waiver of the condition of paying
the fines upon which plaintiff had relied. Id. at 458, 127 N.E. at 266-67 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
154. Recall that Professor Patterson wondered whether § 2-209(3) was not
superflous. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
155. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 150 illustration 1 (1981).
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This illustration follows a comment which expressly refers to § 2209(4) permitting an "unenforceable modification [to] operate as
a waiver."' 5 6 That language suggests that the Restatement (Second)
manifests no doubt that "an attempt at modification not satisfying
Subsection (2) or (3)" is simply an oral modification that is unenforceable because it violates either § 2-209(2) or (3). But, how
does an oral modification changing the date of delivery violate
§ 2-209(3)? The "contract as modified" is the same contract except for the change in the delivery date. Since there is no requirement that a sufficient memorandum include the time of delivery,
the modification changing the delivery date should not be said to
violate § 2-209(3). Moreover, if the modification were made in
good faith, it is enforceable without consideration or other validation device. The entire waiver/estoppel mechanism is unnecessary under § 2-209(4) and (5) since the sine qua non for the
activation of § 2-209(4) and (5) is an oral modification that is unenforceable because of the "public" or "private" statute of
frauds. The Restatement (Second) illustration does not indicate the
inclusion of an NOM clause in the original writing. The illustration must, therefore, refer exclusively to the "public" statute of
frauds (§ 2-201) incorporated in § 2-209(3) as the violated subsection activating § 2-209(4) and (5). With respect to oral modifications concerning delivery or any other terms that are not within
§ 2-201, there should be no statute of frauds problem for the
waiver device to overcome. 57 The Restatement (Second) is very
156. See id. at comment b.
157. Nevertheless, courts apply §§ 2-209(4) and (5) with no conscious appreciation for the requirements of § 2-209(3) that may not need circumvention.
See, e.g., In re Humboldt Fir, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Cal. 1977)(Indian
tribe's intention to grant one-year extension of contract for sale of timber held
to consitute waiver of debtor's breach for failing to perform within one-year extension), aff'd, 625 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1980). In an Illinois Supreme Court case,
the court discussed neither U.C.C. § 2-201 nor § 2-209 in finding an oral extension of the delivery date to be enforceable. Franklin Grain & Supply Co. v. Ingram, 44 Il.App. 3d 740, 358 N.E.2d 922 (1976). If this had been a § 2-209(3)
situation, since the goods were delivered and accepted, satisfaction of any alleged "public" statute of frauds problem would have been found through the
delivery and acceptance of goods satisfaction device of U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(c).
The Minnesota Supreme Court granted the space of a footnote indicating
that an oral modification extending the time for performance would violate
U.C.C. § 2-209(3) since the "contract as modified" would be within U.C.C. § 2201. Barbarossa & Sons, Inc. v. Iten Chevrolet, Inc., 265 N.W.2d 655, 661-62
n.8 (Minn. 1978). That aspect of the opinion should be disapproved.
In a Montana case the court found a U.C.C. § 2-209(4) waiver through
course of performance where the buyer could not take the grain because of a
severe shortage of boxcars in the Spring of 1973. Farmers Elevator, 170 Mont. at
175, 552 P.2d at 63 (1973). In another boxcar shortage case the court held that
even an effective waiver of the time for delivery under the original contract does
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clear concerning the proper interpretation of § 2-209(3); it adheres to the "contract as modified" interpretation suggested earlier in this article. 158 In the quoted illustration, the drafters of
that portion of the Restatement (Second) appear to have forgotten
the scope of § 2-201 of the Code and proceed to make the same
mistake unwittingly made by the courts-the matter is not consciously considered. While the waiver device is unnecessary in
this illustration, it could be beneficial to overcome a § 2-209(2)
NOM clause that requires any modification to be evidence by a
59
writing.'
To overcome the consternation created by § 2-209(4) and
(5), it is particularly important to emphasize their very narrow application. These subsections become operative only if the oral
modification fails to meet the requirements of the "public" or
"private" statute of frauds. If the "contract as modified" requirement under § 2-209(3) or an NOM requirement under § 2-209(2)
will be satisfied by any of the satisfaction devices in § 2-201 as
suggested earlier, the number of unenforceable oral modifications is substantially reduced. If the judicially engrafted general
reliance device' 60 is added to the stated satisfaction devices in
not permit the buyer to demand delivery beyond a reasonable time. Mott Equity
Elevator v. Svihovec, 236 N.W.2d 900 (N.D. 1975).
158. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 149 (1981).
159. One of the more interesting applications of U.C.C. § 2-209(4) occurred in an Alabama case where one of the issues involved an alleged oral modification of the price from 31 to 32 cents per pound. See West-Point Pepperell,
Inc. v. Bradshaw, 377 F. Supp. 154 (M.D. Ala. 1974). The court found a waiver
under § 2-209(4) of the original price term because the plaintiff, in pleading a 32
cents per pound contract, had "waived" the original price term. Id. at 156. A
more desirable analysis would have been the use of U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(a), i.e.,
the admission satisfaction device, and the application of that device to a U.C.C.
§ 2-209(2) (NOM) situation. The court was enforcing an oral modification
through the waiver device of U.C.C. § 2-209(4). The plaintiff's admission of a
32 cents per pound price in the pleadings should be sufficient to enforce the
modification because of the admission and not because of any purported waiver.
Of even more curiosity is a Georgia case in which the court refused to permit course of performance evidence to operate as a waiver with respect to late
payments in the face of a multipurpose clause that attempted to operate as a
merger clause, an NOM clause and an anti-waiver clause. Trust Co. of Ga. v.
Montgomery, 136 Ga. App. 742, 222 S.E.2d 196 (1975). The court's emphasis
on U.C.C. § 2-208(2), creating a hierarchy of express terms, course of performance, prior course of dealing and trade usage, displays a significant failure to
consider U.C.C. § 2-208(3), which permits a course of performance to operate
as a waiver or modification of the express terms of the contract. See U.C.C. § 2208 (1978).
160. The phrase "general reliance device" is used to differentiate a detrimental reliance (promissory estoppel) satisfaction device from the narrow or
specific reliance exception concerning specially manufactured goods in § 2201(3)(a). The general reliance device is not found in § 2-201 and it is plausible
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§§ 2-201, 2-209(2), and 2-209(3), modifications will be enforceable upon a showing of such reliance. Subsections 2-209(4) and
(5) would never apply to such modifications, since they would satisfy the requirements of §§ 2-209(2) and (3). It must be
remembered that the general reliance device was not expressly
part of § 2-201, and the opening phrase of § 2-201161 presents a
formidable obstacle to the inclusion of such a device, notwithstanding the growing body of case law applying a general reliance
exception. 62 If that device had been part of § 2-201, the need
for a restatement of the pre-Code waiver analysis would have
been reduced or, perhaps, eliminated. If any oral modification
will satisfy the NOM or statute of frauds requirements through
reliance, the only theoretical use of the waiver concept would occur where the time for performance of a condition in the original
contract had already expired when the waiver occurred, thus making reinstatement impossible. Since the waiver concept in § 2209(4) and (5) is predicated upon a modification and the conduct
of the parties with respect to that modification, a "waiver after
breach" as it is sometimes called, would invariably involve reliance. Thus, assuming the addition of a general reliance satisfaction device to § 2-20 1, the possibility of a waiver under § 2-209(4)
and (5) becomes academic. The practical elimination of § 2209(4) and (5) argues against the inclusion of a general reliance
satisfaction device in § 2-201 as a matter of statutory construction. Yet, that argument and others suggesting no application of
reliance or promissory estoppel in § 2-201 situations are beginning to resemble quixotic efforts. Once detrimental reliance is
permitted to satisfy the statute of frauds, there should be no question concerning the applicability of reliance to oral modifications,
whether there is a § 2-209(2) or (3) requirement, since either
would be satisfied through such reliance.
Even without the general reliance addition to the § 2-201 satisfaction devices, another peculiarity is inspired by § 2-209(5).
to suggest it was not intended to be included for numerous reasons, including
the express insertion of the specific reliance device. Presumably, the Code drafters were well aware of the general reliance possibility and rejected it, leaving
only the narrow reliance possibility in § 2-201(3)(a). Notwithstanding this and
other arguments against the judicial inclusion of a general reliance satisfaction
device in § 2-201, the courts appear to be moving in that direction.
161. "Except as otherwise provided in this section.
U.C.C. § 2-201
(1978).
162. See Warder & Lee Elevator v. Britten, 274 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa
1979)(majority and dissenting opinions); see also cases cited supra at note 36.
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The literal terms of that subsection163 suggest an oral modification (operating as a waiver) that is withdrawn by due notice to the
other party that strict performance of any term waived will be required before reliance by the other party. A written notice withdrawing a modification, however, may satisfy the requirements of
§ 2-209(2) or (3) by containing the elements of a sufficient memorandum, notwithstanding an intention to revoke the modification.164 An oral notice, if admitted in pleadings, testimony or
otherwise in court, may constitute a § 2-201(3)(b) admission of
the modification, thereby meeting the requirements of § 2-209(2)
or (3) and eliminating any need to pursue a waiver characterization. Indeed, if the writing or admission satisfied subsection (2)
or (3), it would be impossible to activate § 2-209(4), since that
subsection applies exclusively to modifications that do not satisfy
these requirements. The operation of § 2-209(5), therefore, necessarily requires a notice of strict performance of the original
terms with no sufficient written evidence of the oral modification
or court admission that those terms had been orally modified.
The foregoing analysis permits a solution of the mysterious
"it" in § 2-209(4)-"Although an attempt at modification . . .
does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (2) or (3), it can
operate as a waiver."' 6 5 "It" refers to an oral modification that
does not satisfy any of the requirements of § 2-201. We also solve
the question arising from the language, "can operate as a waiver."
An unenforceable oral modification that is not accompanied by
reliance cannot operate as a waiver. Only an oral modification with
reliance can operate as a waiver. This may suggest agreement
with those who argue that a § 2-209(4) oral modification cannot
operate as a waiver without reliance and it is, therefore, essential
to plead reliance to come within § 2-209(4). As is often the case,
however, Professor Corbin provides the necessary illumination:
In a good many cases dealing with this question, the
courts content themselves with saying that the written
contract cannot be modified by oral agreement, without
considering whether or not there was any basis for an
estoppel. If the attempt was to enforce the new oral
163. For the full text of § 2-209(5), see supra note 32.
164. Atlas Railroad Constr. Co. v. Commercial Stone Co., 33 Pa. D&C.3d
477, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1186 (1984)(Callaghan). In Atlas, the trial court
found a written notice of breach to be a sufficient memorandum of a contract to
deliver 76 thousand tons of stone. Id. at 485, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1191.
165. U.C.C. § 2-209(4) (1978) (emphasis added).
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agreement as a purely executory contract and it was itself
within the statute, the decision against enforcement is
correct. If the attempt was to enforce the written contract by a person who had not himself performed a condition thereof, the decision against him is correct unless
the other party can be justly regarded as having caused
the plaintiff's non-performance of the condition. But to
refuse a remedy by merely denying the possibility of an
oral variation is very unsafe, although the cases that do
this can often be justified on the ground that there was in
fact no basis for an estoppel .... 166
This analysis provides a justification for the structure of § 2209(4) and (5). Section 2-209(4) suggests the possibility of an enforceable oral modification as a waiver though the modification
does not meet the requirements of § 2-209(2) or (3): such an oral
modification can operate as a waiver. Section 2-209(5) permits re16 7
traction of that waiver absent reliance creating an estoppel.
Thus, § 2-209(4) reflects the careful Corbin approach in permitting an oral modification or "variation" that does not meet "public" or "private" statute of frauds requirements to be operative
under the waiver construction. In the absence of reliance, § 2209(5) then permits that oral modification, characterized as a
waiver, to be withdrawn. Again, however, if the process of withdrawing the waiver produces satisfaction of the statute of frauds,
though the waiver is withdrawn, the modification becomes enforceable as a modification through such satisfaction. At that point,
any discussion of waivers or withdrawal of waivers is moot since
we no longer have a modification that fails to meet the requirements of § 2-209(2) or (3).
VII.

A JUDICIAL ANALYSIS

A case that threatens to become well-known in the § 2-209(4)
area is Wisconsin Knife Works v. NationalMetal Crafters,168 a relatively
recent product of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Therein, former Professor and now Judge Posner
166. 2 A. CORBIN, supra note 16, § 310, at 116.
167. An earlier draft of § 2-209(5) may emphasize this point more clearly:
"Unless reliance on it has made retraction unjust a waiver which affects an executory portion of the contract may be retracted by receipt of reasonable notice
that strict performance will be required by any term waived." 1949 Draft as
found in VI E. KELLY, supra note 19, at 77.
168. 781 F.2d 1280 (7th Cir. 1986).
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returned to his academic ways in providing a pedagogical look at
§ 2-209.169 Not to be outdone, his colleague and another former
academic lawyer, Judge Easterbrook, provided a scintillating dissent.' 7 0 It is important to consider these recent judicial utterances as illustrative of current judicial thought concerning § 2209.
The Wisconsin Knife Works (Wisconsin) required spade bit
blanks for its manufacturing process. 17 1 Wisconsin entered into
negotiations with National Metal Crafters (National), a spade bit
blank supplier. 72 These negotiations led to the issuance of
purchase orders by Wisconsin which contained a not uncommon
preamble to a list of "conditions of purchase": "Acceptance of
this Order, either by acknowledgment or performance, constitutes an unqualified agreement to the following."' 173 The first
"condition of purchase" following this statement was an NOM
clause: "No modification of this contract, shall be binding upon
Buyer [Wisconsin] unless made in writing and signed by Buyer's
authorized representative. Buyer shall have the right to make
changes in the Order by a notice, in writing, to Seller."' 174 Six
purchase orders were sent by Wisconsin, all containing the foregoing clause. 17 5 The first and second purchase orders were acknowledged by letters from National which said, "Please accept
76
this as our acknowledgment covering the above subject order." 1
A list of delivery dates followed. As there were no delivery dates
in the purchase orders, Wisconsin simply accepted National's
dates. 177 National did not respond in writing to the last four
purchase orders which, like the previous orders, contained no delivery dates. 178 National supplied the dates orally and Wisconsin
completed the blanks in the purchase orders with those dates. 179
Delivery was due in October and November, 1981, but National
169. For a discussion of Judge Posner's opinion, see infra notes 192-214
and accompanying text.
170. For a discussion ofJudge Easterbrook's dissent, see infra notes 216 &
224-42 and accompanying text.
171. The majority opinion describes a "spade bit blank" as "a chunk of
metal." 781 F.2d at 1283.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. For a discussion of the effect of NOM clauses, see supra notes 116-38
and accompanying text.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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did not meet those deadlines. 8 0 Wisconsin did not immediately
treat the contract as breached; in fact, it issued additional
purchase orders on July 1, 1982 (later rescinded).' 8 ' By December of that year, National was producing spade bit blanks in adequate quantities but it was, of course, more than a year behind
schedule. 8 2 OnJanuary 13, 1983, National received notice from
Wisconsin that the contract was terminated. 8 3 At that time,
144,000 of the more than 281,000 blanks ordered by Wisconsin
in the six purchase orders had been delivered. 18 4 Wisconsin
brought an action charging that National had breached the contract by delaying deliveries.1 8 5 National claimed that the delivery
dates had not been intended as firm. 18 6 National also counterclaimed for breach of an alleged oral promise by Wisconsin to pay
the expenses of maintaining machinery used by National to per87
form the contract.'
The trial court held that there was a contract but left to the
jury the question of any modification of the contract and whether
any such modified contract had been broken. 88 The jury found
that the contract had been modified and not breached. 18 9 The
court entered judgment dismissing Wisconsin's action and awarding National $30,000 on its counterclaim. 190 Wisconsin appealed
but the appeal papers did not discuss the counterclaim. Judge
Posner's majority opinion' 9 1 states the "principal issue" as "the
effect of the provision in the purchase orders that forbids the con180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. National was supplying Wisconsin with spade bit blanks under the
original purchase orders, although it was more than a year after the delivery
dates in those orders. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. Wisconsin contended that acceptance of the six purchase orders
formed the contract containing terms of delivery. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. These damages were later stipulated at $30,000. Id.
188. Id. The trial judge sent the modification issue to the jury on the theory
that the contract could be modified orally or by conduct as well as by a signed
writing. National had presented evidence that after accepting late deliveries,
Wisconsin had cancelled the remaining orders, not because of delays in delivery,
but because it could not produce spade bits at a price acceptable to Black &
Decker, of which Wisconsin is a division. Id. at 1284.
189. Id. at 1283.
190. Id. Since the appeal papers filed by Wisconsin did not discuss the
counterclaim, the effects of that issue were left for resolve on remand. Id.
191. The three-Judge panel was composed of Judge Posner, Chief Judge
Cummings and Judge Easterbrook; Judge Easterbrook dissented.
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tract to be modified other than by a writing signed by an author92
ized representative of the buyer."'
There is an early warning in the Posner analysis that this
opinion will not be restricted to § 2-209(2) when he parenthetically cautions the reader that "several other subsections of § 2209 are relevant to the appeal" and, therefore, "we have printed
the entire section as an Appendix to this opinion."'' 9 3 This tour de
force begins with an assertion that the meaning of § 2-209(2) "is
not crystalline and there is little pertinent case law."' 9 4 We are
then treated to a curious dissertation on the meaning of "signed"
in § 2-209(2) and contract formation between Wisconsin and National.' 9 5 Another part of the fact situation is then supplied: Wisconsin modified the specifications. Judge Posner suggests that
this was clearly permitted by a part of the NOM clause, which provided that: "Buyer shall have the right to make changes in the
Order by a notice, in writing, to Seller."' 9 6 He rejects National's
192. 781 F.2d at 1283-84.
193. Id. at 1284. The Appendix appears at 1289-90.
194. 781 F.2d at 1284.
195. After suggesting that "one might think" that National would have
been required to sign a writing containing the NOM clause, the "proviso" in
§ 2-209(2) ("but except as between merchants such a requirement on a form
supplied by the merchant must be separately signed by the other party") "becomes unclear." judge Posner suggests that this proviso "contemplates that between merchants, no separate signature by the party sought to be bound by the
requirement is necessary." He then suggests "a possible reconciliation," i.e., a
separate signing or initialing of the clause as well as signing the document evidencing the contract containing the clause. However, "it doesn't matter" in this
situation, between merchants. Since National signed acknowledgments of the
first two purchase orders, National suggested acquiescence to the same terms in
subsequent purchase orders. The subsequent purchase orders (those after one
and two) were accepted by performance-National "beginning the manufacture
of the spade bit blanks called for by the orders. See U.C.C. § 2-207(3)." 781
F.2d at 1284.
It is particularly difficult to understand the citation to the infamous "battle
of the forms" section of the Code, § 2-207(3), which allows for a contract by
conduct where the exchanged writings of the parties do not form a contract.
The section of Article 2 of the Code that permits a performance acceptance such
as the one suggested by Judge Posner is § 2-206. It is impossible to tell whether
there was one contract or a series of contracts since judge Posner at one point
refers to "the contract" while he later refers to the "contracts" formed by individual purchase orders being accepted by performance. See id. at 1283-84.
Moreover, if the latter is the correct analysis notwithstanding the citation of an
inapplicable section of Article 2, National had delivered only 144,000 of more
than 281,000 ordered blanks by January 13, 1983, while the last of the six
purchase orders was placed on September 10, 1981. Quaere: when were the
goods ordered in purchase orders three through six accepted by National's commencement of performance? This part of the opinion by Judge Posner is intellectually untidy.
196. Id. at 1283-84.
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argument that this written modification by Wisconsin satisfies § 2209(2), because such modifications have nothing to do with § 2209(2): they are made pursuant to the portions of the clause just
quoted and have nothing to do with delivery dates. 9 7 This is an
interesting interpretation of the contract because it would permit
the buyer, unilaterally, to change specifications but still insist
upon original delivery dates. Would the extent of the change in
specifications make no difference even if a reasonable supplier
could not possibly meet the original delivery dates? The fact that
the buyer's right to change specifications is found in a clause that
is otherwise an NOM clause does not move Judge Posner to suggest even the possibility that the clauses could be interpreted so
as to permit the buyer a reasonable extension of time to comply
with the buyer's changes in specifications.
Another factual surprise occurs. National supplied "pert
charts" to Wisconsin which showed new target dates for delivery' 98 (quaere: were these new dates supplied after the specification modification?). Judge Posner was unmoved by this evidence.
These charts "do not purport to modify the contract and were not
signed by Wisconsin Knife Works."' 99 Yet, Wisconsin never supplied dates with respect to any part of this transaction. The original dates were supplied by National, and Wisconsin filled the
20 0
blanks of the purchase orders according to National's dates.
As to the last four of the six purchase orders, National delivered
those dates orally and Wisconsin acquiesced. 20 ' All of those
dates became critical to Judge Posner; they were the contract
dates. 20 2 But National sent new dates in writing. Judge Posner's
first suggestion that these "new target dates for delivery do not
purport to modify the contract 20 3 is more than puzzling. If National notified Wisconsin of new delivery dates, what is it that National was attempting to do other than modifying the contract to
the extent that there had been earlier, firm delivery dates? Does
Judge Posner here suggest that only a formal offer of modification
will satisfy the writing requirement under § 2-209(2)? There is
197. Id. at 1274. Judge Posner notes that, "in any event" the delivery dates
of the contract were not modified. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1284-85.
200. Id. at 1283.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1284. Judge Posner suggests that National cannot complain that
delivery dates were not on the purchase orders when it received them; "it was
given carte blanche to set those dates." Id.
203. Id. at 1284-85.
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no such requirement in § 2-209, since it would be antithetical to
§§ 2-209, 2-201 and all of Article 2 which attempts to effectuate
the factual bargain of the parties and eschews technical
20 4
constraints.
Judge Posner's second reason for refusing to consider the
"pert charts" as sufficient evidence of modifications is that they
"were not signed by Wisconsin Knife Works." 20 5 Again, Judge
Posner is hoisted on his own analysis: if National supplied all of
the dates and Wisconsin simply penciled them in, would such a
course of dealing 20 6 between the parties suggest that National
supply any modified dates and expect to hear any objections from
Wisconsin? National was the sole and exclusive supplier of dates
in this relationship. Wisconsin did not object. The Posner reaction to this National argument raises the question of whether a
writing sent by one merchant to confirm a modification would be
effective to satisfy § 2-209(2). Judge Posner's insistence that Wisconsin must sign such a writing is awkward in light of his prior
analysis permitting National to be bound to the terms of four
purchase orders which National had not signed and to which it
had not sent any signed acknowledgments. 20 7 National was
bound to the terms of those purchase orders because it had sent
signed acknowledgments to the first two purchase orders and was
deemed to have recognized the implications of unwritten assent
to purchase orders three through six. 20 8 That analysis is compatible with the factual bargain of the parties. On the other hand, the
insistence that Wisconsin had not signed the "pert charts" and
could not, therefore, have been bound for that reason alone, is a
mechanical or technical argument that finds no support in § 2209 or the underlying philosophy of Article 2.
Judge Posner recognizes that even though he finds no satis20 9
faction of § 2-209(2), a waiver under § 2-209(4) is possible.
The trial judge's instruction, though failing to use the term,
"waiver," suggested the possibility of a modification through the
parties' course of performance. 2io This instruction compelled
204. For a discussion of the anti-technical nature of Article 2's attempt to
identify the factual bargain of the parties, see supra notes 10 & 11.
205. 781 F.2d at 1285.
206. See U.C.C. § 1-205(1) & (3) (1978).
207. 781 F.2d at 1284. For a discussion of Judge Posner's analysis, see
supra note 195.
208. 781 F.2d at 1284.
209. Id. at 1285.
210. Id.
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Judge Posner to pursue a complete analysis of the "background"
of § 2-209 so as to reconcile §§ 2-209(2) and (4).211 If § 2-209(4)
means that any oral modification can operate as a waiver, Posner
believes that § 2-209(2) is superfluous and we have been returned
to the common law which ignored NOM clauses. National was
not attempting to impose any new term on Wisconsin; rather it
sought to be excused from the original delivery dates through the
oral modification-a classic use of "waiver." 2 12 Posner is unimpressed with this distinction.
Whether the party claiming modification is seeking to
impose an onerous new term on the other party or to
wriggle out of an onerous term that the original contract
imposed on it is a distinction without a difference
.... Whether called modification or waiver, what National... is seeking to do is to nullify a key term other
2 13
than by a signed writing.
How then does § 2-209(4) qualify the strict requirement of an
NOM clause under § 2-209(2)? Judge Posner has no doubt: "[I]f
an attempted modification is effective as a waiver only if there is
reliance, then both sections 2-209(2) and 2-209(4) can be given
effect." 2 14 Judge Posner falls into the error that Professor Corbin
so carefully warned against: "[T]o refuse a remedy by merely denying the possibility of an oral variation [absent reliance] is very
2 15
unsafe."
The Easterbrook dissent uncovers the obvious flaw in this
analysis:
Under the majority's reading, however,. . . [n]o waiver is
effective without detrimental reliance. It is as if the majority has eliminated § 2-209(4) from the UCC and rewritten § 2-209(5) to begin: "A party who has made [an
ineffectual attempt at modification] affecting [any] portion of the contract may retract ....216
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1286. For a discussion of modification as waivers, see supra note
139-68 and accompanying text.
213. 781 F.2d at 1286.
214. Id. at 1287. The scholarly support Judge Posner suggests for their
view is effectively criticized by Judge Easterbrook in his dissenting opinion. See
id. at 1290 (Easterbrook,J., dissenting) (arguing that waiver is not meant to depend on reliance).
215. 2 A. CORBIN, supra note 16, § 310, at 116.
216. 781 F.2d at 1291 (Easterbrook,J., dissenting).
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As suggested earlier, it is possible to provide meaning to subsections (4) and (5) by emphasizing the purpose of (4), which was to
codify common law concepts of waiver by emphasizing the fact
that an unenforceable oral modification can provide the basis for
an effective waiver. 2 17 Then, however, subsection (5) will insist
that the waiver is revocable absent reliance or, to use the common-law language, the party who promised not to insist upon a
condition, will be estopped from asserting that condition. 2 18
Judge Posner appears not to understand the difference between
waiver (estoppel) and modifications that provide a basis for discovering a waiver. Yet, if waivers affecting executory portions of
the contract will not be revocable absent reliance, the Posner conclusion, with that qualification, is acceptable.
Continuing his analysis of § 2-209, Judge Posner considered
the suggestion that his interpretation of § 2-209(4) is inconsistent
with § 2-209(5) as suggested by the dissent. 21 9 To achieve symmetry with that subsection, Judge Posner contends that subsection (5) is the generic waiver section of Article 2 if not the entire
Code. 2 20 Subsection (5), according to this analysis, "is not limited to attempted modifications invalid under subsection (2) or
(3); it applies, for example, to an express written and signed
waiver, provided only that the contract is still executory." 22 1 As
an example, Judge Posner suggests that a buyer might send the
seller a written waiver and revoke it the next day before the seller
has relied, and § 2-209(5) would permit that retraction. 2 22 Such a
waiver would, of course, have nothing to do with unenforceable
modifications. Quaere: would the written waiver operate as a
modification, thereby satisfying the writing requirement under
§ 2-209? Judge Posner does not deal with this possibility. He is
content to suggest that subsection (4) qualifies subsection (2); but
subsection (5) does not qualify subsection (2).223 The dissent,
however, reminds Judge Posner that a signed writing satisfies § 2217. For a discussion of waiver under § 2-209(4), see supra notes 139-62
and accompanying text.
218. For a discussion of the effect of § 2-209(5), see supra notes 146-167
and accompanying text.
219. 781 F.2d at 1287.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. (suggesting that "waiver" means same things in (4) and (5), but
"effect of an attempted modification as a waiver under (4) depends in part on (2),
which (4) (but not (5)) qualifies.")
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209(2) without the need of the "waiver" device. 2 24 We can only
guess that Judge Posner might reply that a writing evidencing a
waiver is not a writing evidencing a modification. The Easterbrook dissent, however, is very sound in suggesting that Judge
Posner has § 2-209(4) and (5) twisted: "This distinction implies
that subsection (4) applies to a subset of the subjects of subsection (5). Things are the other way around. Subsection (4) says
that an attempt at modification may be a 'waiver,' and subsection
(5) qualifies the effectiveness of 'waivers' in the absence of reliance." 2 25 Judge Easterbrook cites comment 4 as support for his
view of the relationship between subsections (4) and (5).226 Because there was no mention of reliance in the instruction to the
jury, the majority found a new trial necessary though it recognized that there was evidence of reliance in the record. Because
of the erroneous construction of § 2-209(4), however, such reli2 27
ance was not the focus of the case.
In the dissent, beyond those disagreements with the Posner
analysis already noted, Judge Easterbrook suggests his own construction of § 2-209(4).228 He insists that § 2-209(4) can operate
without a showing of reliance, 229 and he illustrates this operation
by a "characterization" of the dealings between Wisconsin and
National that he regards as the preferable characterization based
on the jury's finding that the parties had modified their contract. 230 The modification permitted National additional time to
perform and National took more time. 23 1 On January 13, 1983,
when Wisconsin chose to wait no longer, Judge Easterbrook suggests that Wisconsin could then have withdrawn the waiver as to
the executory portion of the contract, unless National could have
shown reliance that would have estopped Wisconsin. 23 2 Wisconsin would then have an action for breach of the executory portion
of the contract, but it would be estopped from claiming breach
224. Id. at 1291 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1292. Comment 4 to § 2-209 reads as follows: "Subsection (4)
is intended, despite the provisions of subsections (2) and (3), to prevent contractual provisions excluding modification except by a signed writing from limiting
in other respects the legal effect of the parties' actual later conduct. The effect
of such conduct is further regulated in subsection (5)." U.C.C. § 2-209 comment
4 (1978).
227. 781 F.2d at 1288.
228. Id. at 1291-92 (Easterbrook,J., dissenting).
229. Id. at 1292 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
230. Id. at 1292-93 (Easterbrook,J., dissenting).
231. Id. at 1293 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
232. Id.
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because of any delay in delivery by National. 23 3 This analysis is
certainly in keeping with the traditional analysis of waiver which
§ 2-209(4) and (5) presumably sought to codify. Again, it is a
classic illustration of the utility of waiver in pre-Code cases.
Judge Esterbrook furthers the analysis by rejecting a suggestion
that § 2-209(4) could be effective in making a substitute agreement between
the parties enforceable, under the guise of
"waiver. ' 234 Such a change in the relationship "would be thoroughgoing reshaping of the obligations which could not occur
unless reflected in a 'signed writing.' ",235 He is not, however, impressed with the "pert chart" argument, i.e., if Wisconsin had
orally agreed to the new dates on the pert chart, Judge Easterbrook would not permit enforcement of that agreement because
that would not be a "signed writing" evidencing a modification.2 3 6 However, because he has not necessarily considered the
possibility of the pert chart as a confirmation of an oral agreement
extending the dates, we simply cannot tell whether Judge Easterbrook would permit a § 2-201(2) confirmation between
merchants to satisfy § 2-209(2) against the non-signing party. It
is abundantly clear, however, that the pert chart would not be an
effective § 2-209(2) writing because it was not signed by
2 37
Wisconsin.
VIII.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Perhaps the most intriguing question concerning judicial and
scholarly interpretations and constructions of § 2-209 is why
there is so little concern for pre-Code concepts that were virtually
identical to the concepts found in subsections (2) through (5).
The irony is that the big change, the modification of the pre-existing duty rule, 2 38 has demonstrated few problems. The § 2-209
conundrums begin after § 2-209(1), and a clear understanding of
the predecessors to § 2-209(2) through (5) would have prevented
the occurrence of much of the current § 2-209 mystery. Cer233. Id.
234. Id. (analysis based on National's suggestion that "purchase orders
never were the 'real' contract.").
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. 781 F.2d at 1285. For the full text of § 2-209(2), see supra note 14.
238. It should be remembered that § 2-209(1) does not emasculate the preexisting duty rule; it simply makes it inoperative in good faith modifications. An
extorted or bad faith modification would fall prey to the pre-exiting duty rule.
For further discussion of the pre-existing duty rule, see supra note 8-13 and accompanying text.
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tainly, Professor Patterson's views should not have been ignored. 23 9 Judge Easterbrook's dissenting opinion in Wisconsin
Knife2 40 provides the preferable judicial analysis to the present
24
time and he found assistance in the work of Professor Corbin. 1
Unfortunately, even that opinion cites only one section of
Corbin;24 2 it may have found another section even more
243
beneficial.
The following summary of the preferable construction of § 2209 may prove helpful.
Section 2-209(1) has worked quite well. The courts display
24 4
little difficulty in its application.
Section 2-209(2) permits the parties to restrict their future
course of action in modifying their contract. The typical NOM
clause requires any modification to be evidenced by a writing.
There is, however, no reason to preclude the use of any of the
satisfaction devices in § 2-201 to satisfy an NOM requirement.
Consistency with §§ 2-201 and 2-209(3) as well as the underlying
philosophy of Article 2, with its emphasis upon the removal of
technical constraints, should permit any of the § 2-201 satisfaction devices to meet the evidentiary function that § 2-209(2) requires. If the jurisdiction has added a general reliance
satisfaction device to § 2-201, that device should also be available
to satisfy § 2-209(2) requirements. Where that device is available,
the use of a § 2-209(4) waiver/estoppel to overcome the § 22 45
209(2) requirement will be severely limited.
Section 2-209(3) should receive the traditional interpretation
so forcefully urged by Corbin and others: treat the "contract as
modified" as the only contract. If there is an original writing that
contains the essential terms of the contract as modified, i.e., identification of the parties, subject matter, quantity (including requirement and output contracts) and the general requirement
that the writing evidence a real transaction, the writing should be
effective even though it contains other terms such as price, time
of delivery, or other non-essential memorandum terms that have
239. For a discussion of Professor Patterson's views, see supra note 12.
240. See 781 F.2d at 1290 (Easterbrook,J., dissenting).
241. Id.
242. Id. (citing 6 A. CORBIN, supra note 16, § 1295 at 211-12).
243. See 2 A. CORBIN, supra note 16, § 310.
244. For a more complete discussion of the application of § 2-209(1), see
supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text.
245. For a more complete discussion of the application of § 2-209(2), see
supra notes 116-138 and accompanying text.
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been orally modified. The recognition of the scope of § 2-209(3)
as limited to "the contract as modified," will eliminate a number
of situations as candidates for the application of waiver/estoppel
under § 2-209(4) and (5). If the general reliance satisfaction device is added to the stated devices in § 2-201 (again, depending
upon the judicial recognition of that device), it is difficult to conceive of a § 2-209(4) waiver operating to relieve an unenforceable
modification under § 2-209(3).246
Section 2-209(4) should be limited to the traditional
waiver/estoppel situations. If a party pleads an oral modification,
however, he should have an opportunity to prove that a condition
to the duty of the other party was eliminated through the oral
modification. Typically, such evidence will prove reliance, but
§ 2-209(4) does permit waivers of conditions to executed por24 7
tions of the contract.
Section 2-209(5) permits the waiving party to retract the
waiver by reasonable and timely notice. If such notice satisfies the
memorandum requirement of either § 2-209(2) or (3), however,
§ 2-209(4) and (5) are inapplicable because the writing requirement has been satisfied. Should the process of withdrawing the
waiver involve any other satisfaction device under § 2-201 (including, where appropriate, the judicially engrafted general reliance device), the requirements of § 2-209(2) or (3) should be
deemed satisfied and § 2-209(4) and (5) should be considered
248
inapplicable.
Notwithstanding the developing case law in § 2-209, many of
these questions, including the critical questions of scope, have
not been addressed by the courts. The future of § 2-209 need not
be mysterious or uncertain. If we continue to believe that we are
dealing with radical departures from pre-Code law, however, the
tendency to create holistic analyses or curious waiver devices
from isolated subsections will continue. Article 2 has suffered
enough. It deserves more effective judical and scholarly thought.
246. For a more complete discussion of the application of § 2-209(3), see
supra notes 79-115 and accompanying text.
247. For a more complete discussion of the application of § 2-209(4), see
supra notes 139-167 and accompanying text.
248. For a more complete discussion of the application of § 2-209(5), see
supra notes 148-167 and accompanying text.
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